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This research sought to determine what, if any, effect the
primary personality characteristics exhibited by contract nego-
tiators have on negotiation outcome. Additionally, this re-
search sought to determine what, if any, effect the buyer's en-
gaging in preparatory mock negotiation has on negotiation outcome,
If it were found that certain personality characteristics or
buyer-seller personality similarity/dissimilarity correlated
significantly with desirable negotiation outcomes, then know-
ledge of those characteristics or similarity/dissimilarity and
their respective correlations with negotiation outcomes could
enhance negotiator selection, training, and effectiveness in
DOD. Likewise, if it were found that the buyer's engaging in
preparatory mock negotiation resulted in a significantly improved
negotiation outcome in actual negotiation, then the conduct of
such preparatory mock negotiation in DOD could enhance negoti-
ator effectiveness. Toward making these determinations, 7
negotiations involving 56 contract negotiators were conducted
at 11 DOD activities and 3 defense contractors' facilities. Data
collected from these negotiations included the prices negotiated
and an assessment of each negotiator's personality. These data
were then processed and analyzed using established statistical
methods. Based on these analyses, it could be concluded neither
that personality characteristics exhibited by the negotiators,
nor that the buyer's engaging in preparatory mock negotiation af-
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A. THE ROLE OF NEGOTIATION IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS
Negotiations play a significant role in the acquisition
of goods and services by the Department of Defense. During
Fiscal Year 1978 alone, the Department of Defense expended
a total of $55.6 billion in acquiring goods and services;
$45.4 billion of that total represented acquisition by means
of negotiation. From another point of view, that $45.4 bil-
lion represented almost nine million acquisition actions
2
accomplished by means of negotiation.
To the lay person, negotiation is considered to be limited
to initial pricing and agreement of contract terms and condi-
tions. In fact, however, negotiation plays a far greater
role in Department of Defense acquisition. Indeed, the follow-
ing, although by no means an exhaustive list, is exemplary of
the areas in which the Department of Defense and the contractor
4
negotiate before award and during contract administration.
1. The price, terms, and conditions of the original con-
tract.
2. Contract interpretation after award.
3
.
Adjustments pertaining to government-furnished property
facilities, and special tooling.
4. Changes in delivery points, drawings and specifications,
and the equitable adjustment pertaining thereto.
5. Variations in quantity.
6. Determinations as to whether items produced satisfy
the specifications.

7. Price revision under redetermination, escalation, and
incentive provisions.
8. Problems associated with the acceptability of individual
items of cost under cost-type contracts.
9. Negotiation of overhead rates for cost-type contracts.
10. Acceptability of accounting, inspection, and purchasing
systems
.
11. Approval of "make or buy" programs and individual sub-
contracts .
12. Negotiation of problems in connection with the patent
and technical-data provisions of the contract.
13. Termination settlements and problems associated with
the disposal of property.
The range and magnitude of negotiation's role in Department
of Defense acquisitions are great. The degree of effectivity
that the Department of Defense attains in its acquisition-related
negotiations significantly affects, cost-wise and otherwise, the
accomplishment of its mission to provide for the defense of the
United States.
B. FACTORS THAT AFFECT NEGOTIATION
The importance of procurement negotiations in providing
for the defense of the United States suggests the need for a
continuing effort in the Department of Defense to improve
negotiation effectiveness and, thereby, to improve the out-
comes attained through negotiation. A requisite first step
in this effort would appear to be identifying the factors, or
variables, which affect negotiation effectiveness. Subsequent
steps would include determining the impact of the variables,
individually and jointly, and, with this knowledge, attempting




With respect to these steps, Rubin and Brown sought, in
their review of more than one thousand research and other
publications, to discover a theory of negotiation, or, failing
that, at least a single organizing conceptual framework for
developing such a theory. They found neither; but, as a major
part of their effort, they reviewed a wealth of research per-
taining to the effects of "independent variables," e.g., the
negotiator's attitude, motivation, power, etc., on the "depen-
dent variable," negotiating effectiveness. The independent
variables considered by Rubin and Brown are presented in
Table I, which, additionally, provides descriptions of terms
used in the following paragraphs.
TABLE I
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF THE NEGOTIATION RELATIONSHIP
A. SOCIAL COMPONENTS OF THE NEGOTIATION STRUCTURE
1. The Presence of Audiences
2. The Availability of Third Parties
3. The Number of Participants Involved
B. PHYSICAL COMPONENTS OF NEGOTIATION
1. The Location of the Negotiation Site
2. The Physical Arrangements at the Site









3. The Number of Issues
4. The Format of the Issues
5. The Presentation of the Issues





Rubin and Brown defined a negotiator who exhibited
high interpersonal orientation as one who was first and
foremost responsive to the interpersonal aspects of his
relationship with the other and who was both interested
in, and reactive to, variation in the other's behavior.
They defined a negotiator who exhibited low interpersonal
orientation as one who was nonresponsive to the inter-
personal aspects of his relationship with the other and
who was interested neither in cooperating nor competing
with the other but, rather, in maximizing his own gains,
regardless of how the other fared.
2 Motivational Orientation
Rubin and Brown defined the negotiator's motiva-
tional orientation, i.e., his attitudinal disposition
toward the other, in terms of: cooperativeness , i.e.,
having a positive interest in the other's welfare as well
as his own; competitiveness, i.e., having an interest in
doing better than the other v/hile doing as well for himself
as possible; and individualism, i.e., having an interest






. The Distribution of Power in the Relationship
(Equal Versus Unequal )










Source : Rubin, J. Z. and Brown, B. R. , The Social
Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiations, pp. 1-350,
Academic Press, 1970.
Among all of the factors identified, Rubin and Brown focused
the preponderance of their attention on the personal character-
istics of the negotiator and the effects thereof on negotia-
o
tion effectiveness. Based on their review of research accom-
plished, they found that:
1. A cooperative motivational orientation of the negotiator
tended to enhance negotiating effectiveness more than
an individualistic motivational orientation and, parti-
cularly, more than a competitive motivational orientation,
2. More effective negotiation ensued when power among the
negotiators was equal rather than unequal.^
3. When power among the negotiators was unequal, the party
with greater power tended to behave exploitatively
,




The smaller the discrepancy in negotiators ' power
,
the more effective they were likely to function. 12
13

5. The smaller the total amount of power, the more effective
the negotiators were likely to function. 13
6. Negotiators who were induced to be high in interpersonal
orientation tended to function more effectively than
those who were induced to be low in interpersonal
orientation.
"
7. Negotiators tended to function most effectively when
they shared a cooperative motivational orientation and
were of equal power, functioning least effectively
when they shared a competitive motivational orientation
and were, again, of equal power (the interaction of
motivational orientation and power) . ^
8. Negotiators tended to function most effectively when
they shared a cooperative motivational orientation and
were high in interpersonal orientation, functioning
least effectively when they shared a competitive
motivational orientation and were, again, high in
interpersonal orientation (the interaction of , ,-
motivational orientation and interpersonal orientation)
.
9. Negotiators tended to function most effectively when they
were of equal power and were high in interpersonal orien-
tation, functioning least effectively when they were of
unequal power and were, again, high in interpersonal
orientation (the interaction of power and interpersonal
orientation) . '
10. Negotiators tended to function most effectively when
they shared a cooperative motivational orientation,
were of equal power, and were high in interpersonal
orientation (the interaction of motivational orienta-
tion, power, and interpersonal orientation).
As the findings above indicate, Rubin and Brown observed
that the social components, the physical components, and the
issues affect negotiating effectiveness in varying degrees but
concluded that the personal characteristics of the negotiators
affect negotiation effectiveness most significantly. The in-
stant research, as well, while recognizing that other variables
affect negotiation effectiveness, focused, in important part,
on the personal characteristics of the negotiator.
14

C. THE ROLE OF THE NEGOTIATOR IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS
As seen in the review of the work by Rubin and Brown,
the variables associated with the negotiator were strongly
suggested to be key determinants of negotiation outcome. It
would follow, therefore, that the role of Department of Defense
negotiators is crucially important in maximizing negotiation
effectiveness
.
Within the Department of Defense, the negotiator may--
depending on what aspect of the contract is being negotiated
—
be the procuring contracting officer, the cost/price analyst,
the legal representative, or any of several technical personnel
prior to and during the term of the contract; and, during the
performance of the contract, the negotiator may be the admini-
strative contracting officer, the auditor, an inspector, a pro-
perty administrator, a security representative, or any of a
host of United States Government personnel concerned with the
19performance and administration of the contract. (In this re-
search, however, concern was focused principally on the procuring
contracting officer, the price analyst, the administrative con-
tracting officer, and the career negotiator— in other words,
those personnel who assumed a role of leadership in negotiations.)
Entrusted to each of these negotiators was found the responsibi-
lity to maximize the interest of the United States Government
20
with respect to national defense; and upon the same negotiators
was found dependent, in large measure, the defense capability of
the United States. The role of the negotiator in Department of
Defense acquisition was, therefore, found to be important indeed.
15

From a somewhat different perspective, Procurement Associ-
ates, Inc., speaking as a contractor, added support to the view
that the negotiator is critically important by stating,
"In no other procedure does so much money change hands
based on the ability of single individuals as it does
in negotiation. In Government contracting, particularly,
a negotiator can make or break the company. He is the
most important profit center the company has. He should
be chosen, trained, and treated accordingly . "*1
Essentially the same statement might well be made regarding the
contract negotiator in the Department of Defense. He is criti-
cally important.
Rubin and Brown added additional weight to the importance
of the negotiator in negotiation in their conclusion that,
"It is [the] exchange of information [by negotiators],
the attributions to which it leads, and the ways in
which it is shaped for the purpose of mutual social
influence that represents the fundamental strategic
issue in [negotiation] . "^1
Moreover, as stated above, the fact that Rubin and Brown devoted
the majority of their effort in the reference cited to research
of the variables of the negotiating relationship associated
with the negotiators themselves added still more weight to the
importance of the negotiator variables vis a vis other variables.
D. THE SELECTION OF NEGOTIATORS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
In the selection of contracting officers and, coincidentally
,
negotiators, the Department of Defense instructs the appointing
authority to consider the experience, training, education,
business acumen, judgment, characteristics, reputation, and
23
ethics of the prospective selectees. Further, the Department
of Defense instructs the appointing authority to evaluate, in
16

considering the prospective selectee's experience, training,
24
and education, the following factors:
1. Experience in a government procurement office,
commercial procurement, or related fields.
2. Formal education or special training in business
administration, law, accounting, or related fields.
3
.
Completion of the Defense Procurement Management
Course or other procurement courses.
4. Knowledge of the provisions of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulations and of other applicable
regulations
.
It is acknowledged, first, that these Department of Defense
instructions to the appointing authority were written with all
aspects of the contracting officer's duties and responsibilities
in mind--of which negotiation is only one, albeit an important
one. It is acknowledged, further, that all of the factors re-
quired by the Department of Defense to the considered are cer-
tainly germane to the selection of a qualified contracting of-
ficer. However, the absence of more emphasis on personal
characteristics was found to be notable--particularly in light
of the emphasis placed on such characteristics by virtually
every author who has discussed negotiation or negotiators.
Rubin and Brown in their research, for example, considered
the interpersonal orientation, the motivational orientation, and
the power of the negotiator to be of primary importance, alloca-
25
ting their greatest emphasis to these personal characteristics.
Bearden and Chipman, in their effort to identify and rank
personal characteristics in terms of their relative importance,
summarized the personal characteristics considered significant
fi>
by six notable writers as presented in Table II. They,
17

themselves, employing a Delphi methodology, considered and
ranked 27 personal characteristics compiled by Novak and
27Whitley and evaluated by recognized contract negotiators
2 8
at the three divisions of the Air Force Systems Command.
These 27 personal characteristics are presented in ranked
order in Table III.
In addition to the cited writers who sought to identify and/or
rank or correlate personal characteristics with negotiator ef-
fectiveness, numerous other writers have researched, or other-
wise treated such characteristics in relation to negotiator
effectiveness. It was considered important at this point,
however, only to note the importance, suggested by the volume
of research accomplished, of personal negotiator characteristics
as determinants of negotiator effectiveness and the importance
of considering such characteristics in the selection of negoti-
ators .
E. THE NEGOTIATOR'S PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATION
Considering the numerous variables that affect negotiating
effectiveness, Procurement Associates, Inc., concluded that,
for a negotiator with any given personality characteristics,
preparation was the most important prerequisite to effective
negotiation and that no amount of experience, skill, or per-
29
suasion could compensate for the lack thereof. They stated,
further, speaking from the buyer's point of view, that the
extent of preparation for negotiation, together with the amount
of competition present among sellers and the adequacy of the
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Source : Bearden, J. G. and Chipman, J.C., Personal
Characteristics of Force Contract Negotiators ,
yT. S~i Thesis , Air Force Institute of Technology,




Final Rank-Order of Personal Characteristics
RANK CHARACTERISTIC ASD ESD SAMSO SUM
RANK RANK RANK
1 Self-Confidence 1. 1.5 1.5 4.
2 Adaptability- 2.5 5.5 1.5 9.5
3 Rational 4. 1.5 5. 10.5
4 Verbal Skill 6. 4. 9.5 19.5
5 Integrity- 2.5 8. 9.5 20.
6 Experience 7. 11.5 3. 21.5
7 Self-Control 3. 3. 11. 22.
8 Realistic 5. 10. 7.5 22.5
9 Task Orientation 13.5 5.5 4. 23.
10 Planning Ability 10. 7. 13. 30.
11 (tie) Deliberate 15.5 13. 6. 34.5
11 (tie) Authority 9. 11.5 14. 34.5
12 Good Listener 11.5 9. 15.5 36.
13 Persuasive 13.5 14. 15.5 43.
14 Reputation 20. 18. 7.5 45.5
15 Self-Esteem 11.5 16.5 21. 49.
16 Tactfulness 19. 19.5 12. 50.5
17 Skepticism 18 16.5 18. 52.5
18 Sense of Timing 21. 15. 18. 54.
19 Patience 17. 21.5 18. 56.5
20 High Expectations. 15.5 21.5 20. 57.
21 Expertise 22. 19.5 22. 63.5
22 Empathy 23. 23. 23. 69.
23 Education 25. 24. 24. 73.
24 Academic Discipline 24. 25. 25. 74.
25 Status 26. 26. 26. 78.
26 Beliefs 27. 27. 27. 81.
Source
:
Bearden, J. G. and Chipman, J. C.
,
Personal
Characteristics of Air Force Contract Negotiators,
W. S~T Thesis , Air Force Institute of Technology,
Wright-Patterson AFB , 1977, p. 22.
20

Procurement Associates, Inc., generalized the major steps
31
in preparing for negotiations as:
1. Gathering the facts, including, most importantly,
gaining a clear and comprehensive understanding of
what is being acquired.
2. Analyzing the facts and the intangibles that will
affect subsequent negotiations
.
3. Establishing the negotiation objectives, based on
the analysis.
4. Planning the strategy and tactics necessary to
achieve the objectives during negotiation.
Beyond the four steps suggested by Procurement Associates,
Inc., it was speculated that the negotiator might well seek to
test his readiness for negotiation prior to implementing his
negotiation plan during actual negotiation. One means found
to be in use to test the negotiator's preparation and plan
was the submittal of his plan to his organizational superior (s)
32for in-depth review and approval or disapproval. Another
means found to be in use was "murder-boarding" the plan, i.e.,
a procedure whereby a group of persons sufficiently familiar
with the prospective negotiation sought to identify weaknesses
in the preparation and plan and to offer constructive changes
33for the improvement thereof. A third means considered was
engaging in a simulated negotiation with another person suffi-
ciently familiar with the prospective negotiation to play the
role of the seller. Brosius and Erickson reported that this
latter role-playing means of preparation had been employed in
the legal profession, in the labor relations field, and in the
aerospace industry and was found within those groups to enhance
34
the attainment of the goals and objectives sought.
21

A review of the literature revealed that role-playing has
been employed extensively in education, training, problem-
35
solving, and therapy. The employment of role-playing as a
preparation technique for procurement negotiations, however,
was not found to be reported. Of note, nevertheless, was a
rating by training directors of the effectiveness of role-playing
vis a vis other techniques as a method of training for attaining
various training objectives. This rating was reported by
Carroll, et al , in Personnel Psychology , and is presented in
Table IV. The rating involved 117 training directors from
the 2 00 United States firms employing the largest number of
37persons. Of particular importance m this study was the find-
ing that role-playing was ranked second among nine training
methods employed in improving interpersonal skills."1 Ruling
out sensitivity training (which was ranked first among the nine
methods) as an appropriate method of preparing for negotiation,
role-playing emerged as a potentially excellent technique for
enhancing negotiator preparation--particularly in light of the
research accomplished by Rubin and Brown and their emphasis on
the importance of the interpersonal-orientation variable in
39
negotiations.
With interest in exploring the effect of the role-playing
technique in preparing for negotiations, Erosius and Erickson
conducted an experiment in 1974 to measure the effect of simu-
40lated negotiations on final negotiated results. This experi-
ment is believed to be the first attempt to isolate and measure
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on actual negotiated outcome (defined as the price the buyer
would pay) . Brosius and Erickson employed, as participants in
the experiment, Department of Defense procurement careerists.
As a vehicle for the experiment, one role-playing, buyer vs
seller, contract-negotiation case was used for training in De-
41partment of Defense procurement management courses. Essen-
tially, they divided the participants into two groups, experimental
and control. Experimental-group participants playing the role
of buyer engaged in mock negotiations with participants playing
the role of the buyer's supervisor preparatory to "actual" ne-
gotiations. Experimental-group buyers then negotiated with
participants playing the role of the seller in "actual" negoti-
ations. Next, control-group participants playing the role of
buyer negotiated with participants playing the role of seller
in the "actual" negotiation. Control-group buyers negotiated
only once in the "actual" negotiation. Likewise, participants
playing the role of seller negotiated only once in the "actual"
negotiation. Brosius and Erickson then statistically compared
the price that the experimental-group buyers, with the benefit
of preparatory mock negotiation, negotiated in an "actual"
negotiation with the price that the control group, without the
benefit of preparatory mock negotiation, negotiated in an
"actual" negotiation. The result of the comparison was, sur-
prisingly, a finding that the experimental-group buyers, who had
engaged in preparatory, role-playing, mock negotiation negotiated
a significantly higher [less desirable) price than the control-
42
group buyers, who had not engaged in mock negotiations.
24

Upon review of Brosius and Erickson's experimental design
and methodology, several possible explanations arose as to why
the outcomes indicated that the effect of the buyer's having en-
gaged in preparatory mock negotiations resulted in a higher
negotiated price in the "actual" negotiation. These explanations
are addressed below. In short, a review of the Brosius and
Erickson experiment revealed that their finding was inconclusive;
therefore, at this stage of the instant research, the effect of
mock negotiation as a means of preparing for actual negotiation
remained unknown.
F. KEY ELEMENTS OF NEGOTIATOR EFFECTIVENESS
Based on the literature reviewed thus far, it appeared safe
to assume that among all of the variables that affected negoti-
ation effectiveness—the social components, the physical com-
ponents, the issues, and the negotiators themselves— those per-
taining to the negotiator were the most important. In the range
of variables pertaining to the negotiator and negotiator effec-
tiveness, which for convenience might be categorized as back-
ground characteristics, personality characteristics and prepara-
tion, Procurement Associates, Inc., stated that the most important
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variable was negotiator preparation. Rubin and Brown consid-
ered the negotiator's personality characteristics to be most
44important. Finally, all writers reviewed considered the
background variables and the personality-characteristics variables
to be significantly important. Additionally, Brosius and Erick-
son and others addressed the potential benefit of employing
role-playing, mock negotiations as a preparation technique.
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Among the key elements of negotiator effectiveness, then,
preparation and personality characteristics were prominent;
and mock negotiation was prominent as a potentially excellent
preparation technique. It is with this orientation that this
research sought to explore further the effect of preparatory
mock negotiation and personality characteristics on negotiations
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II. THE BASIS OF THE RESEARCH
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Negotiation is of crucial importance in Department of
Defense acquisitions. The selection, training, guidance, and
performance of contract negotiators by the Department of Defense
have been continuing concerns, as indicated by the Report of the
45Commission on Government Procurement in 1972. Furthermore,
the personality characteristics of and the preparation by the
negotiator are believed by a number of writers to be key ele-
ments of negotiator effectiveness. Further, mock negotiation
was found to be potentially prominent among various preparation
techniques. However, the personality characteristics considered
by the writers— students of negotiation—were found to be with-
out consensus as to which were important and as to the relative
importance among them. Moreover, an indicative measurement
of the effect of the various personality characteristics -and
of preparatory mock negotiations on negotiation effectiveness
in the area of Department of Defense acquisition contracts was
not found to exist except that inconclusive measurement cal-
4 6
culated by Brosius and Erickson. Thus, the Department of
Defense has had available no universal set of personality
characteristics on which to focus in negotiator selection,
training, and guidance. Nor has it had available a credible
and indicative measurement of the effect of mock negotiations
on negotiation effectiveness. Availability of this informa-
tion to the Department of Defense might well, it appeared,
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provide the basis for enhancement of selection, training,
guidance, and, significantly, performance of contract negoti-
ators.
Accordingly, it was the purpose of this research to
seek to identify a credible and universally recognized set
of measurable personality characteristics and to measure the
effects thereof on negotiation effectiveness. Additionally,
the purpose of this research was to measure the effects of
mock negotiation, employed by the buyer as a preparation
technique, on negotiation effectiveness.
B. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
As indicated above, this research sought:
1. To identify a credible and universally recognized
set of measurable personality characteristics.
2. To measure the effects of that set of personality
characteristics on negotiation effectiveness,
defined herein as the price negotiated.
3. To measure the effects, if any, of mock or simulated
negotiations employed by the buyer on negotiation
effectiveness
.
This research did not attempt to determine the effect of
other variables of negotiation effectiveness, such as those
structural, physical, issue, or other negotiator variables
identified by Rubin and Brown.* Moreover, it did not attempt
to measure the effects of personality characteristics or mock
negotiation on negotiation effectiveness when such effective-
ness is defined as other than price. (Although, in light of
the effect on price, one might surmise what the effects would
be on other negotiation outcomes, i.e., other terms and condi-
tions of the contract.) Further this research focused on
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negotiation as it was found to be employed by Department of
Defense personnel in obtaining defense contracts with firms.
It did not consider other negotiations, e.g., labor negotiations,
although the results of this research might apply equally or
similarly to those negotiations.
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
This research was limited principally by the practical im-
possibility of identifying and controlling all variables af-
fecting negotiating effectiveness. Those elusive variables
included: those associated with the experimental environment's
being contrived in lieu of actual; those associated with the
physical aspects of the negotiating environment and the dif-
ferences thereof among the locations at which the experiment
was conducted; those associated with the differences in age,
education, and experience among the participants within and
among participating activities; and those associated with
other, unrecognized factors.
D. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions were:
1. Does a credible, universally recognized set of
measurable personality factors exist in the current
state of knowledge?
2. If a credible, universally recognized set of measurable
personality factors exists, then what, if any, effects
do these factors have on negotiation effectiveness?
E. THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
The research hypotheses were:
1. The Null Hypothesis, Ho: Mock, or simulated, negotiation




2. The First Alternative Hypothesis, H, : Mock, or
simulated negotiation employed by the buyer and not
by the seller affects negotiation effectiveness
positively, i.e., correlates significantly with a
lower price.
3. The Second Alternate Hypothesis, H 2 : Mock or
simulated negotiation employed by the buyer and not
by the seller affects negotiation effectiveness
negatively, i.e., correlates with a higher price.
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III. DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH
A. THE BASIC DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH
1. The Brosius and Erickson Experiment
The design of the instant research evolved from the test
structure employed by Brosius and Erickson to isolate, and meas-
ure the effect of, negotiator background variables and the use
of mock negotiation as a preparation technique on negotiation
48
effectiveness. The model of their test structure was as
49follows
:
GROUP: SIMULATED NEGOTIATIONS "ACTUAL" NEGOTIATIONS
Experimental Buyer #1 vs Buyer #2 Buyer #1 vs Seller #1
Control None Buyer #3 vs Seller #2
Basically, their model provided for comparing the price negotiated
by Buyer #1, who had previously employed simulated negotiation
with Buyer #2 as a preparation technique, with that negotiated
by Buyer #3, who had not employed simulated negotiation as a pre-
paration preparation technique. The instrument used to generate
both the mock negotations and the "actual" negotiations was a
structured, role-playing contract negotiation case in use as a
training aid in contract administration courses conducted by the
Continuing Education Division, School of Systems and Logistics,
Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB , Ohio.
Thus, if the mean price negotiated by the participants playing
the role of Buyer #1 was statistically significantly different
from the mean price negotiated by participants playing the role
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of Buyer #3, it could be concluded that mock negotiation affected
negotiation effectiveness, i.e., price negotiated, when employed
by the buyer and not by the seller as a preparation technique for
.. .. 51
negotiation.
Additionally, in the Brosius and Erickson experiment, the
52
participants completed background questionnaires identifying:
1. Their branch of service, i.e., U. S. Air Force or other.
2. Their Civil Service or Military Rank.





5. Their years of service in the procurement career area.
6. The number of Department of Defense procurement-related
courses completed.
7. The number of negotiations involving an examination of
cost or pricing data in which the participant had been
engaged during the past year.
8. The number of companies with which the participant had
negotiated during the past year.
9. The largest contract (in terms of dollar value) that the
participant had negotiated during the past year.
10. Whether or not the participant had experience as a
negotiator in commercial marketing or sales.
11. Their creativity as measured by a test developed by
Dr. E. Paul Torrence and Mr. Joe Khatena of the
University of Georgia.
The independent variables, i.e., preparatory simulated nego-
tiation and the background variables, were then regressed against
the dependent variable, price, representing negotiation effec-
tiveness, to ascertain whether any of the independent variables




The results of the Brosius and Erickson experiment were as
follows
:
1. Buyer #l's employment of simulated negotiation as a
preparation technique was significantly associated
with a higher negotiated price ($3368 higher than
the mean of $160,510)
.
2. Among the other independent variables, the following
background characteristics were found to be statisti-
cally significant:
a. The negotiator's age (younger buyers were associated
with lower negotiated prices) .
b. The years of government service in the procurement
career area (relative to the seller's experience,
more experienced buyers were associated with
significantly lower negotiated prices) .
c. The number of separate companies with which the
buyer participant had negotiated relative to the
number of separate companies with which the seller
had negotiated (relative to the seller, the buyer
with a greater number of negotiations with companies
was associated with a significantly lower negoti-
ated price) .
With respect to the effect of simulated negotiation on
"actual" negotiation effectiveness, one might have found the
results of the Brosius and Erickson experiment intuitively
disturbing. It v/as anticipated by Brosius and Erickson that
the use of simulated negotiations by the buyer and not by the
seller would correlate with a decrease in the price "actually"
negotiated, instead of an increase; this suspicion was, in fact,
55the alternate hypothesis on which their experiment was based.
Accordingly, upon seeing the results of their experiment, they
analyzed the background data of each negotiator to determine
whether the traits of the participants playing the role of the
seller and/or the role of Buyer #3 (control group) were dominant,
thus nullifying the effect of Buyer #1 (experimental group)
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preparation by means of simulated negotiation; and they con-
cluded that the traits of all participants were evenly distri-
ct c
buted, thus appearing to be random. Beyond this analysis,
Brosius and Erickson considered the following possible explana-
tions as to why the results indicated that simulated negotiations
correlated with an increase in price instead of a decrease:
1. The motivations of non-volunteer participants could
have been quite different from those of contract
negotiators engaged in actual negotiations.
2. The instrumental test negotiation case could have
possessed an unforeseen amount of bias in terms of
negotiating "power" in favor of the control-group
buyers and/or the experimental-group sellers.
3
.
Test procedures and time constraints could have
affected negotiation effectiveness in favor of the
control -group buyers
4. Simulated negotiation might have resulted in an
intuitively more palatable effect on negotiation
effectiveness if supervisors, instead of colleagues,
had played the role of "Devil's Advocate."
Finally, they stated, "Many other potential 'boundary variables'
could be listed; however, their influence on the outcomes of
58the experiment are unknown."
In addition to the unknown effects of the variables consi-
dered by Brosius and Erickson, the design of the test structure
used in their experiment was examined. This examination led
to the question as to whether the structure of the test as de-
signed adequately provided for isolating the basic differences
between the experimental-group participants playing the role of
Buyer #1 and the control-group participants playing the role
of Buyer #3. It appeared that it did not. Brosius and Erickson
obtained the background and creativity characteristics of the
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participants playing the roles of Buyer #1 and Buyer #3,
respectively, and based their assessment of basic negotiator-
capability differences thereon. However, the number of back-
ground and creativity characteristics considered by Brosius and
Erickson was extremely limited and by no means exhaustive of
even the very significant negotiator characteristics identified
by the more prominent writers/students of negotiation and ne-
gotiators discussed in Chapter I. This number was, therefore,
believed to be inadequate to ascertain, with acceptable validity,
the basic difference between the negotiating abilities of the
two buyers. Isolation of this difference was a necessary pre-
requisite for isolating the effect of simulated negotiations
on "actual" negotiations. If this basic difference was not
isolated and defined, then the effect thereof on negotiation
effectiveness must necessarily have been commingled with the
effect of simulated negotiations. Thus, it appeared that ascer-
taining neither the effect of the basic difference in negotiator
abilities on negotiation effectiveness nor the effect of simu-
lated negotiations on negotiation effectiveness was possible.
Rather, the design of the experiment provided, generally, only
for identifying the combined effect of both the basic difference
in negotiator abilities and simulated negotiations on negotiation
effectiveness
.
Additionally found to be notable in the design of the Brosius
59
and Erickson experiment was their statement that:
"Multiple repetitions of the test situation involved
a major complication. A key element in any negotiation
is the degree of uncertainty which exists about the final
outcome; without this element, the negotiation would cease
to be a negotiation, per se , and would degenerate to an
enactment or re-enactment of a role-playing situation
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within the context of the scenario. This is because an
individual is capable of true, creative negotiation in
a given case only once. The test scenario presents a
valid negotiating atmosphere only if each repetition is
performed with entirely different negotiators."
These statements, if true, appeared to render the entire experi-
ment suspect. Buyer #1 did, indeed, negotiate the same instru-
mental test case twice—once during simulated negotiation with
Buyer #2 and, again, during "actual" negotiation with Seller #1.
If it were true that an individual were "capable of true, creative
negotiation in a given case only once," then Buyer #1 would have
been capable of "true, creative negotiation" only during simula-
ted negotiations and not during "actual" negotiations; thus,
presumably, the value of simulated negotiations with respect to
Buyer #1 would have been nil, at best, or negative. These
statements were, however, found to be unsupported and unacceptable.
Such statements were considered analagous to stating that beyond
reaching a deadlock in negotiation, the negotiators were incapa-
ble, insofar as creativity was concerned, of resolving the points
of conflict and negotiating a final satisfactory agreement.
On the contrary, the fact that in the experimental design of
Brosius and Erickson, Buyer #1 and Buyer #3 negotiated with dif-
ferent sellers was considered to frustrate and even render im-
possible any attempt to isolate the effect of simulated nego-
tiation. As discussed, above, the unknown difference between the
abilities of Buyer #1 and Buyer #3 was complicated by the dif-
ference between the abilities of Seller #1 and Seller #2; and
when these two differences were further complicated by the
simulated-negotiation variable, the three variables, i.e., the
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two differences and the simulated-negotiation variable, became
confounded, thus rendering isolation and measurement of the
effect of simulated negotiations practically impossible. Con-
sequently, it was considered imperative in the instant experi-
ment that the difference between the abilities of Buyer #1 and
Buyer #3 be identified and defined and that the basic ability
of the seller be held constant insofar as was possible. Other-
wise, it was considered, any attempt to isolate and measure the
effect of simulated negotiations would be frustrated by the
commingling of uncontrolled variables constituting the negoti-
ators' basic abilities.
2. The Instant Experiment
To seek answers to the research questions and to test
the hypotheses in the instant research, a search was made for
a credible and universally acceptable set of personality char-
acteristics and a means by which to measure the characteristics.
Such a set and the means by which to measure it were found in
the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF) , developed
principally by Dr. Raymond B. Cattell and published by the In-
stitute for Personality and Ability Testing, Champaign, Illinois.
The 16PF was found to be appropriate for use in measuring primary
source traits, i.e., factors affecting large areas of the overt
personality behavior, such as intelligence, emotional stability,
superego strength, surgency, and dominance, and, thereby, pro-
viding a basis for determining the effect of the source traits
on negotiation effectiveness.
To test the hypotheses in the instant research, the
experimental design described and developed by Brosius and
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Erickson was modified in an effort to improve control of the
independent variables. The model of the experimental design
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This model described, basically, in the sequence of
events followed:
1. Buyer #1 and Seller #1 negotiating Case #1 in "Actual"
negotiation.
2. Buyer #2 and Seller #1 negotiating Case #1 in "Actual"
negotiation.
3. Buyer #1 and Seller #2, playing the role of Buyer #l's
Supervisor, negotiating Case #2 in simulated negotiation
preparatory to Buyer #l's "Actual" negotiation of the
same case with Seller #1.
4. Buyer #2 preparing for his negotiation of Case #2 with
Seller #1 in any manner desired by him—except by means
of simulated negotiation—during the negotiation of
Case #2 by Buyer #1 and Seller #1.
5. Buyer #2 and Seller #1 negotiating Case #2 in "Actual"
negotiation.
This sequence was followed in fifty percent of the four-participani
iterations of the experiment described by the model. In the
complementary fifty percent of the iterations, the sequence was
modified such that Seller #1 negotiated Case #1 first with Buyer
#2 and second with Buyer #1 and, then, negotiated Case #2 first
with Buyer #2 and second with Buyer #1.
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This model was designed, basically, to provide for:
1. Creating motivation for the negotiators to negotiate,
by employing structured role-playing contract negoti-
ation cases, or "scenarios," sufficiently representa-
tive of actual negotiation cases, or scenarios, to
generate among the experiments participants motivation
to negotiate approximating that motivation that they
would experience in actual negotiation in the "real
world."
2. Holding constant the oppositional, Seller #1 negotiator-
related variables confronting both buyers in each itera-
tion of the experiment by structuring the experiment
such that Buyers #1 and #2 negotiated with only one
Seller #1 in Phases I and III.
3. Employing Case #1 to isolate the "Baseline" difference
between Buyer #1 negotiator effectiveness and Buyer #2
negotiator effectiveness and Case #2 to isolate the
effect of simulated negotiation on actual negotiation
effectiveness, i.e., the dependent variable, Price.
4. Minimizing the effect of Seller #l's negotiating each
case more than once on the constancy of the oppositional
negotiator-related variables confronting both Buyers by
counterbalancing the sequence of negotiations in each
iteration of the experiment, as described above. ^1
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTRUMENTS USED
1. The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF Test )
The 16PF Test selected for use in this research was
found to be prominent among instruments currently employed to
assess most of the important dimensions of personality and,
6 2possibly, to be "the best personality inventory there is."
Essentially, the test was found to be based on the personality-
sphere concept developed by R. B. Cattell, an eminent psycholo-
gist, and to be designed to ensure coverage for all behavior
commonly entering ratings and the dictionary descriptions of
63personality. Finally, the 16PF Test was found to be based
on a "series of interlocking researches over twenty-five years,
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directed to locating unitary, independent, and pragmatically
64important 'source traits' both in ratings and questionnaires."
CSource traits" referred to "factors affecting large areas of the
overt personality behavior, such as intelligence, emotional sta-
bility, superego strength, surgency, and dominance." ) In sum,
the 16PF Test was designed as an all-purpose instrument, bringing
to applied psychology the concepts central to general personality
theory, including, for general usefulness, a measure of intelli-
gence but excluding any measurement of motivation and interest.
The primary source traits measured by the 16PF Test are pre-
sented in Table V.
2. The Role-playing, Contract-negotiation Cases
As indicated, above, in the model describing the design
of the instant experiment, two role-playing, contract negotiation
cases, or scenarios, were employed. Both cases were similar in
that they involved the acquisition of special-production-run
hardware by negotiation at prices of greater than $100,000 and
less than $500,000. Additionally, both cases involved essen-
tially a negotiation of labor hours (involving learning curve)
,
labor rates, material rates, overhead, and profit. Finally,
both cases involved a negotiation of contract type and delivery
schedule.
Case #1, entitled "Galvanometer" and employed in Phase
I iterations of the experiment, was a scenario constructed solely
for use in the instant experiment. It was based principally and
liberally on a case contained in Government Prime Contracts and
67Subcontracts Service , and was used with the permission of the




THE PRIMARY SOURCE TRAITS COVERED BY THE 16PF TEST
FACTOR
LOW STEN SCORE DESCRIPTION
Cl-3)














Affected by feelings, emotionally




































































Undisciplined self-conf lict, lax, Controlled, exacting will power,
follows own urges, careless of socially precise, compulsive, fol-
social rules lowing self-image
Low self-sentiment integration High strength of self-sentinent







__..-. Cattell, R.B., Eber, H.W. , and Tatsuoka, M.M., Handbook for the
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire, 197Q ed. , Institute for Personality
"
aiid AbiliLy Tehliug, Champaign, Illinois , 19/0, p. IbA.
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role of the seller, thus lending itself well to determining the
"baseline" difference between the negotiator effectiveness of
Buyer #1 and Buyer #2 and to determining the effect of negotiator
personality characteristics on negotiation effectiveness. A
complete copy of the "Galvonometer" Case is presented in Appendix
A.
Case #2, entitled "Apex Aviation" and employed in Phase
II and Phase III iterations of the experiment, was a role-playing
scenario designed by Dr. D. N. Burt to develop negotiating skills
and was used with his permission. This case was found to be
ideally suitable for use in that it consisted of the role of
the buyer, the role of the buyer's supervisor, and the role of
the seller and in that its design provided for the buyer's nego-
tiating first in a simulated negotiation with his supervisor
playing the role of seller, but with no more information than the
buyer had and for the buyer's negotiating second in an "actual"
negotiation with the seller. Thus, this case lent itself well
to the design of the experiment to determine the effect of simu-
lated negotiation on actual negotiation effectiveness. A com-
plete copy of the Apex Aviation Case is presented in Appendix B.
C. THE SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS
The selection of participants to play the roles of Buyers
#1 and #2 and Sellers #1 and #2 was accomplished by soliciting
the participation of military activities and commercial corpora-
tions on the Wefet Coast. These organizations were sufficiently
large and sufficiently experienced in negotiating Department of
Defense contracts to employ contract negotiators, contracting
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officers, contract administrators, and/or cost-price analysts
experienced in negotiating contracts of the type represented
by the role-playing, contract-negotiation cases employed in the
experiment. Eleven military activities and three commercial
corporations, identified in Appendix C, responded affirmatively.
These activities and corporations, in turn, solicited the parti-
cipation of personnel employed therein and judged by their super-
visors to be qualified, with respect to knowledge and experi-
ence, to negotiate contracts for greater than $100,000. A total
of 56 employees agreed to participate in the experiment. These
participants were then assigned to play the roles of Buyer #1,
Buyer #2, etc., on an indiscriminate basis. Among these 56
employees, ages, educational attainments , organizational posi-
tions, and professional background and experience levels varied.
However, all were sufficiently knowledgeable of Department of
Defense contract negotiations to negotiate the contracts con-
templated in the role-playing cases employed, and all were
sufficiently experienced to have participated previously in a
Department of Defense contract negotiation. Thus, selection of
participants was accomplished on a pragmatic, opportunistic,
rather than technically preferable strictly random basis; and,
accordingly, the sssultant sample of elementary units, or parti-
cipants, was of the category which may be classified as a com-
bination of convenience and judgment —convenient in that the
sample was restricted to contract negotiators located on the
West Coast and agreeable and available to participate, and
judgmental in that the sample was restricted to contract
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negotiators judged by their supervisors to be sufficiently-
knowledgeable and experienced to negotiate the type of contract
contemplated in the role-playing cases employed in the experiment.
Therefore, the results of the instant experiment were subject both
to possible sampling error, i.e., "the differences between the
sample and the population that are due solely to the particular
elementary units that happen to have been selected," and sampling
bias, i.e., the "tendency [however unconscious] to favor the se-
6 9
lection of elementary units having particular characteristics,"
On the other hand, there was no awareness of any reason to
believe that the participants in the instant experiment were not
representative of the population of contract negotiators in the
area of Department of Defense contract negotiations; and, there-
fore, the selection of participants was assumed to be random.
D. THE SEQUENCE OF THE EXPERIMENT
The instant experiment was conducted employing two sequences
of events. In seven of the 14 four-participant iterations of
the experiment, one sequence, "A", applied; in the complementary
seven, another sequence, "B", applied. The model representing
the two sequences that were employed is presented below:
HOUR #1 HOUR #2 HOUR #3 HOUR #4 HOUR #5




























HOUR #1 HOUR #2 HOUR #3 HOUR #4 HOUR #5
ROLE PLAYER PHASE I PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE III
SEQUENCE B
CASE #1 CASE #2 CASE #2
Bl # r s8-14 16PF Bl vs SI Bl vs S2 Bl vs SI
"~
CASE #1 CASE #2
B2 #'s 22-28 B2 vs Si 16PF B2 vs Si ^_
CASE #1 CASE #1 CASE #2 CASE #2
51 #'s3 6-42 B2 vs Si Bl vs SI 16PF B2 vs SI Bl vs Si
CASE #2
52 #'s50-56 16PF Bl vs S2
From the point of view of the experimenter, this model de-
scribed the activities of each participant in each five-hour,
four-participant iteration of the experiment. In those itera-
tions in which Sequence A was employed, participant activities
were as follows
:
1. Hour #1. During hour #1 of the iteration:
a. Buyer #1 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #1 and re-
ported the results to the experimenter.
b. Buyer #2 and Seller #2 completed the 16PF Question-
naire.
2. Hour #2. During hour #2 of the iteration:
a. Buyer #1 completed the 16PF Questionnaire.
b. Buyer #2 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #1 and re-
ported the results to the experimenter.
3. Hour #3. During hour #3 of the iteration:
a. Buyer #1 and Seller #2 negotiated Case #2 and re-
ported the outcome to the experimenter.
b. Seller #1 completed the 16PF Questionnaire.
4. Hour #4, During hour #4 of the iteration:
Buyer #1 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #2 and reported
the outcome to the experimenter.
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5. Hour #5. During hour #5 of the iteration:
Buyer #2 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #2 and reported
the outcome to the experimenter.
In those iterations in which Sequence B was employed, parti-
cipant activities were as follows:
1. Hour #1. During hour #1 of the iteration:
a. Buyer #1 and Seller #2 completed the 16PF Question-
naire.
b. Buyer #2 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #1 and re-
ported the results to the experimenter.
2. Hour #2. During hour #2 of the iteration:
a. Buyer #1 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #1 and re-
ported the results to the experimenter.
b. Buyer #2 completed the 16PF Questionnaire.
3. Hour #3. During hour #3 of the iteration:
a. Buyer #1 and Seller #2 negotiated Case #2 and re-
ported the results to the experimenter.
b. Seller #1 completed the 16PF Questionnaire.
4. Hour #4. During hour #4 of the iteration:
Buyer #2 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #2 and reported
the results to the experimenter.
5. Hour #5. During hour #5 of the iteration:
Buyer #1 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #2 and reported
the results to the experimenter.
In connection with the description of the sequences of events
above, it should be noted that the buyer or seller roles for both
Case #1 and Case #2 were distributed to the participants, as
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appropriate, at least 24 hours prior to the beginning of the
iteration. Thus, each participant was given at least 24 hours
prior to the negotiations to study this role and prepare a
negotiating position for each case. It should be noted further
that while Buyer #1 engaged in preparatory mock negotiation
with Seller #2 in each iteration, Buyer #2 was free to review
or "fine tune" his negotiating position for Case #2 or to take
an additional break, as he chose.
Finally, it is again emphasized that the objective in em-
playing two sequences instead of just one was to equalize, insofar
as was possible among 14 iterations of the experiment, the abi-
lity of Seller #1 with respect to the number of times he had
previously negotiated each (and both) case(s) when negotiating
each case with each buyer. For example, in Sequence A, when
Buyer #2 and Seller #1 negotiated Case #2, Seller #1 had pre-
viously negotiated Case #2 once and Case #1 twice for a total
of three negotiations; hov/ever , when Buyer #1 and Seller #1
negotiated Case #2, Seller #1 had previously negotiated Case #2
never and Case #1 twice for a total of only two negotiations.
By employing one sequence of events during seven iterations and
the other sequence of events during the complementary seven
iterations, the ability of Seller #1 with respect to the number
of times he had previously negotiated was equalized between
the Buyer #l's and Buyer #2's negotiating with him within Phase
I and within Phase II.
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E. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PARTICIPANTS
At the beginning of each iteration of the experiment, each
participant was given the following instructions in addition to
the information contained in the role-playing cases:
1. That he should attempt to play the buyer or seller
role assigned—unencumbered, insofar as was possible,
by his actual employment role of contract administra-
tor, price analyst, etc.
2. That his objective was to acquire the product if he
were playing the role of buyer or to sell the product
if he were playing the role of seller.
3. That he had complete authority to negotiate an agree-
ment at whatever price he determined to be acceptable,
4. That he had one hour to reach agreement.
5. That he should use the information available to him
as given and as he determined to be most advantageous
to him. -.
In addition to these instructions and the information con-
tained in the role-playing cases, the participants were provided
answers to general questions that they asked regarding coffee
breaks, lunch periods, etc. After receiving answers to their




IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. DATA COLLECTION
A total of 56 procurement careerists representing eleven
military activities and three commercial corporations participated
in the experiment. Data were collected pertaining to the parti-
cipants' personalities and to the price-outcome of the negoti-
ations. The data pertaining to the participants' personali-
ties consisted of the raw score for each of the 16 primary per-
sonality factors assessed in the 16PF Questionnaire for each buyer
and seller participant. The data pertaining to the price-
outcome of the 56 negotiations consisted of the dollar amounts
negotiated and agreed upon by each buyer-seller negotiation pair
for each role-playing case negotiated except the mock-negotiation
case. All of the data collected during the 14 iterations of
the experiment are presented in Tables VI and VII.
Table VI, 16PF RAW SCORES FOR NEGOTIATION PAIRS, identifies
each of the 16 primary personality factors assessed by the 16PF
Questionnaire and describes in layman terms the personality
characteristic indicated by a low or high raw score, in a range
of to 12, for each factor. Beyond identifying and describing
the 16 personality factors, Table VI presents the raw score
generated by each of the participants for each factor. Table
VI is arranged to facilitate comparing the factor scores of
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PARTICIPANT NUMBER SEQUENCE PHASE I PHASE III PRICE
BUYER SELLER (A OR B) CASE #1 CASE #2 DIFFERENCE
A. EXPERIMENTAL GROUP
01 29 A 63,000 337,500 274,500
02 30 A 85,000 316,991 231,991
03 31 B 71,500 395,000 323,500
04 32 A 92,500 402,500 310,000
05 33 A 138,000 401,400 263,400
06 34 A 95,000 402,800 307,800
07 35 A 90,000 351,000 261,000
08 36 B 78,000 392,500 314,500
09 37 B 95,000 377,860 282,860
10 38 B 95,000 410,000 315,000
11 39 B 67,000 365,000 298,000
12 40 A 115,000 409,000 294,000
13 41 B 71,226 390,000 318,774
14 42 B 111,000 363,055 252,055
CONTROL GROUP
15 29 A 65,000 307,000 242,000
16 30 A 90,000 350,000 260,000
17 31 B 88,360 387,000 298,640
18 32 A 92,500 432, 500 340,000
19 33 A 99,000 414,000 315,000
20 34 A 90,000 404,000 314,000
21 35 A 71,500 400,000 328,500
22 36 B 78,000 399,500 321,500
23 37 B 85,870 377,812 291,942
24 38 B 99,000 409,000 310,000
25 39 E 67,060 364,250 297,190
26 40 A 103,000 425,000 322,000
27 41 B 73,680 303,990 230,310




SUMMARY DATA FOR THE PRICES NEGOTIATED
PHASE I/CASE #1 PHASE III/CASE #2 PRICE DIF-
MEAN MEAN FERENCE MEAN
SEQUENCE (STD DEV'N) (STD DEV'N) (STD DEV'N)
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP
A 96,928.5714 374,455.8571 277,527.2857
(23,728.3736) ( 38,138.5008) ( 28,277.535 )
B 84,103.7143 384,773.5714 300,669.8571
(16,408.0762) ( 17,021.8180) ( 25,603.791 )
TOTAL 90,516.1429 379,614.7143 289,098.5714
(20,697.8881) ( 28,874.1546) ( 28,562.433 )
B. CONTROL GROUP
A 87,285.7143 390,357.1429 303,071.4286
(13,975.7443) ( 45,444.7598) ( 37,002.735 )
B 87,138.5714 363,597.7143 276,459.1429
(17,146.5161) ( 43,300.2050) ( 49,488.145 )
TOTAL 87,212.1429 376,977.4287 28 9,765.28 57
(15,028.2361) ( 44,847.6380) ( 44,192.256 )
C. EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS
A 92,107.1429 382,406.5000 290,299.3571
(19,366.0871) ( 41,141.0395) ( 34,302.6008)
B 85,621.1429 374,185.6429 288,564.5000
(16,199.7249) ( 33,463.3663) ( 39,883.8111)
TOTAL 88,864.1429 378,296.0714 289,431.9286
(17,828.0582) ( 37,035.5403) ( 36,513.3647)
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Table VII, THE PRICES NEGOTIATED, identifies each buyer-
seller negotiation pair, the sequence of negotiations that ap-
plied in the iteration of the experiment in which the pair
participated, the price negotiated for Case #1, "The Galvanometer
Case," the price negotiated for Case #2, "The Apex Aviation
Case," and the price difference, representing the difference be-
tween the price negotiated for Case #1 and the price negotiated
for Case #2 (computed by subtracting the Case #1 price from the
Case #2 price). With respect to sequence, described above,
Sequence A consisted of Seller #l's negotiating Case #1 first with
Buyer #1 (experimental group) and second with Buyer #2 (control
group) followed by his negotiating Case #2 first with Buyer #1 and
second with Buyer #2. Sequence B consisted of Seller #l's negoti-
ating Case #1 first with Buyer #2 and second with Buyer #1 fol-
lowed by his negotiating Case #2 first with Buyer #2 and second
with Buyer #1. With respect to the price difference, the objec-
tive in computing and displaying the difference was to facilitate,
in each iteration of the experiment and, later, for all iterations,
determining whether the experimental-group buyer, having en-
gaged in preparatory mock negotiation, had improved his negoti-
ating effectiveness from Case #1 to Case #2 relative to the
control-group buyer, considering the baseline difference between
the two buyers in the price negotiated in Case #1.
In addition to the raw data, summary data for the. prices
negotiated and the price differences are presented in Table
VII. These data include for each group ard the two groups com-
bined, by each sequence and by both sequences combined, the
mean and the standard deviation computed for the prices
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negotiated for Case #1 in Phase I, the prices negotiated for
Case #2 in Phase III, and the price differences.
The Personality-factor data contained in Table VI and the
negotiated-price data contained in Table VII, then, comprised
all of the data collected during the experiment. These data
were used to seek answers to the research questions as to the
effects of various personality factors on negotiation effec-
tiveness and as to the effect of the buyer's engaging in pre-
paratory mock negotiation on actual negotiation outcome.
B. DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS
Upon completion of the 14 four-participant, five-negotiation
iterations of the experiment, the data collected and presented
in Tables VI and VII were processed as a first step toward ob-
taining answers to the research question as to what, if any,
effect measurable personality factors have on negotiation ef-
fectiveness and toward testing the research hypotheses relating
to what, if any, effect engaging in preparatory mock negoti-
ations has on actual negotiation effectiveness. Data processing
was accomplished by employing the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) , a system of computer programs for
statistical procedures which facilitated the correlation analyses
and the analysis of variance required during the research. Upon
completion of the data processing, the results thereof were
analyzed to find answers to the research questions and hypotheses.
1 . Data Processing
To seek an answer to the research question as to what,
if any, effect measurable personality factors (considered
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synonymous with personality characteristics) have on negotiation
effectiveness (as indicated by the price negotiated) , first, the
price negotiated by each buyer participant and the raw scores for
each of the 16 personality factors of each buyer were processed
to determine whether or not a correlation existed between any
of the raw scores and the price and, if so, the direction and
strength of the correlation. Such data processing would, for
example, facilitate determining whether or not greater buyer-
negotiator effectiveness (i.e., lower negotiated price) cor-
related positively or negatively, weakly or strongly with higher
intelligence, 16PF Questionnaire Factor B. To accomplish this
processing, Pearson CORR, a sub-program of SPSS, was employed.
The Pearson CORR sub-program basically calculates
Pearson product-moment correlations for pairs of variables,
producing the Pearson correlation coefficient r, which measures
the strength of the relationship between the two variables, in-
dicating both the goodness of fit of a linear regression line
2to the data and, in r , the proportion of variance in one vari-
72
able explained by the other, ~ i.e., the extent to which vari-
ation in one variable is linked to variation in the other vari-
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able. Additionally, the Pearson CORR sub-program conducts and
reports a test of the significance of the correlation coefficient,
using the student's t with N-2 degrees of freedom for the com-
puted quantity
N-2 1,74
/ -5 2 •
1 - r
z






-K,'.7>ie /-- > ' Y: l/l
where x. = ith observation of variable x, for example, price
y- = ith observation of variable y, for example, raw
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score, Factor B.
The Pearson CORR sub-program thus produced r values,
2
r values, and significance-test results for each price (nego-
tiated for Case #1) - factor raw score (for each buyer partici-
pant) pair of variables contained in Tables VI and VII, e.g.,
price-factor A raw score, price - Factor B raw score, price -
Factor C raw score, etc. The results of the processing cf
these data are presented in Table VIII and are discussed below
in the Data Analysis Section.
The next step in processing the data to determine the
effect, if any, of personality factors on negotiator effective-
ness consisted of applying the Pearson CORR sub-program as de-
scribed above to the variable, price difference, representing
the difference in the price negotiated by each buyer participant
for Case #1 and the price negotiated by him for Case #2, and the
raw score produced by each buyer for each of the 16PF Question-
naire personality factors. This processing of data was accom-
plished to facilitate determining the strength of correlations
of improvement in buyer-negotiator effectiveness from Case #1
to Case #2 and the raw score of each personality characteristic,
for example, whether or not a smaller price difference, indicating
relatively greater improvement, correlated with a higher raw
score for 16PF Factor B, intelligence. The results of processing
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these data are presented in Table IX and are discussed below
in the Data Analysis Section.
The next step in processing data collected consisted
of applying, for each buyer-seller negotiating pair, the Pear-
son CORR sub-program to the variables representing the buyer's
raw scores for all 16 personaltiy factors and the seller's raw
scores for all 16 personality factors and producing thereby a
composite correlation coefficient, r, representing the degree
of similarity or dissimilarity between the personalities of the
buyer and the seller. These correlation coefficients then were
compared, by application of the Pearson CORR sub-program, with
the prices negotiated for Case #1, with the prices negotiated
for Case #2, and with the price differences between the prices
negotiated for Case #1 and Case #2. The objective of this ap-
proach to processing the data was to determine the strength of
the correlation of the variable representing the personality
similarity-dissimilarity of each buyer-seller negotiation pair,
i.e., the correlation coefficient, and the variable representing
the price negotiated by each buyer-seller negotiation pair. This
processing was accomplished, in other words to facilitate deter-
mining whether or not, for example, buyer-seller-negotiation-
pair personality similarity or dissimilarity correlated posi-
tively or negatively with lower or higher negotiated prices, cr
,
in the case of the price difference, greater or less improvement
in buyer negotiator effectiveness. The results of this data pro-














A Reserved vs Outgoing 28 -0.0420 .416
B Dull vs Bright 28 -0.5777 .001
C Affected by Feelings
vs Emotional Stability 28 0.0792 .244
E Humble vs Assertive 28 0.1109 .287
F Sober vs Happy-Go-Lucky 28 0.0844 .335
G Expedient vs
Conscientious 28 -0.1565 .213
H Shy vs Venturesome 28 0.2530 .097
I Tough-minded
vs Tender-minded 28 0.0110 .478
L Trusting vs Suspicious 23 -0.1168 .277
M Practical vs
Imaginative 28 0.2717 .081
N Forthright vs Astute 28 -0.2241 .126
Self-Assured vs
Apprehens ive 28 -0.1805 .179
Qi Conservative vs
Experimental 28 -0.0654 .370
Q 2 Group-Dependent vs
Self-Sufficient 28 -0.1770 .184
Q 3 Undisciplined Self-Conflict vs Controlled 28 -0.1834 .175




CASE #1 - CASE #2 PRICE DIFFERENCE
— BUYER PARTICIPANT 16PF










A Reserved vs Outgoing 28 -0.0093 .481
B . Dull vs Bright 28 0.2268 .123




E Humble vs Assertive 28 0.2403 .109
F Sober vs Happy-Go-Luc:ky 28 0.0854 .333
G Expedient vs
Conscientious 23 -0.2485 .101
H Shy vs Venturesome 23 0.0144 .471
I Tough-minded
vs Tender-minded 28 -0.0630 .375
L Trusting vs Suspicious 28 -0.0528 .395
M Practical vs
Imaginative 28 -0.0358 .428
N Forthright vs Astute 23 0.03 93 .421
Self-Assured vs
Apprehensive 23 -0.1327 .250
Qi Conservative vs
Experimental 28 0.3277 .044
Q 2 Group-Dependent vsSelf-Sufficient 28 -0.0351 .430
Q 3 Undisciplined Self-Conflict vs Controlled 28 -0.1804 .179
Q 4 Relaxed vs Tense 28 0.0293 .441
60

To seek an answer to the research question as to what,
if any, effect preparatory mock negotiation has on actual nego-
tiation effectiveness, the price difference between the price
negotiated for Case #1 and the price negotiated for Case #2 for
each buyer in the experimental group was compared with the
price difference for each buyer in the control group. Such
processing of the data would facilitate determining whether or
not the mean price difference for the experimental-group buyers
and the mean price difference for the control-group buyers
were the same or different, statistically, and coincidentally
determining whether or not preparatory mock negotiations had
any effect on actual negotiation outcome with respect to price.
To accomplish this processing, ANOVA, a sub-program of SPSS,
was employed.
As applied to the experimental model
SEQUENCE BUYER GROUP
EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL
A Price differences Price differences
B Price differences Price differences
where price difference is the dependent, or criterion, variable,
and buyer group and sequence are categorical independent vari-
ables, or factors, the ANOVA sub-program decomposes the total
variation in price difference, which may be represented by
SS
, into three independent components: the portion of the
total variation in SS due to the variation in the two means
y
of the experimental and control categories of the Buyer-Group




CORRELATION OF BUYER-SELLER PERSONALITY SIMILARITY WITH
CASE #1 PRICES, CASE #2 PRICES, AND CASE #1 PRICE
—
CASE #2 PRICE DIFFERENCES
BUYER- BUYER-SELLER CORRELATION CORRELATION CORRELATION
SELLER PERSONALITY WITH CASE #1 WITH CASE #2 WITH CASE #1
NUMBERS CORRELATION/ PRICES/PRO- PRICES/PRO- -CASE #2PRICE






































of the total variation in SS due to the variation in the two
means of the A and B categories of the sequence factor, respec-
tively, which may be denoted SSB ; and the portion of the total
variation in SS due to the interaction of the Group and Se-
quence factors, which is the variation in the two means of the
experimental group, Sequence A and control group, Sequence B
cells pooled and the experimental group, Sequence B and control
group, Sequence A cells pooled, respectively, and which may be
denoted SS^n. (Generally, if differences in the Group cate-
gories produced the same effect whether the participants fol-
lowed Sequence A or Sequence B, and if differences in the se-
quence followed produced the same effect whether the partici-
pants were in the experimental group or the control group, then
the interaction component would tend to be nil.) Thus, the
model for the ANOVA sub-program is SS = SS,. + SS D + ss, ny A B AB
7 8
+ SS '" (the ss error representing variation not accounted
for by either the factors or their interaction, i.e., the vari-
ation of individual prices about the means of the cells in
which they are located)
.
Upon completion of calculating the SS components, the
ANOVA sub-program computes degrees of freedom (df) for each of
the SS components. For the group factor, SS A , df equals the
number of categories minus one (2-1=1); for the sequence factor,
SSg, df equals the number of categgries minus one (2-1=1); for
the interaction of the two factors, SS^d, df equals (the num-
ber of categories of factor A minus one) times (the number of
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categories of factor B minus one) , or (2-1) (2-1) = 1; for the
total, SS , df equals the total number of data points, i.e.,
price differences, minus one (28-1 = 27); and for the error
term, ss error > df = the df for SS minus the df for SSA minus
the df for SSB minus the df for SSAfi (27-1-1-1 = 24)
,
79
With the SS components and the degrees of freedom com-
puted, the ANOVA sub-program next calculates the mean square (ms)
for SS , SS , SS_, SS , and SS _„
rt_
by dividing each of the SS
8
calculations by its associated df.
The next step in the processing of the data through the
ANOVA sub-program is a calculation of the F ratio and the sta-
tistical significance thereof for each of the mean squares cal-
culated except that for MS , which is the figure by which
each of the other mean squares is divided to determine the F
8
1







and the significance thereof to determine whether all of the
observed sums of squares, Le. , SS, + SSB + SSAR , due to factors
A and B are likely to have come from a population where no such
effects exist, i.e., whether the variation in SS equals the
variation in SS










RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PRICE DIFFERENCES
A. CELL MEANS
SEQUENCE GROUP














B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
SOURCE OF SIGNIFI-
VARIATIONS SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F CANCE
OF F
Main Effects 24, 179,648 2 12,089,824 009 0.991
Group (G) 3, 111,555 1 3,111,555 .002 0.962
Sequence (S) 21, 068,096 1 21,068,096 016 0.900
Interaction
(G,S) 4,332, 199,936 i-i- 4,332,199,936 3 .286 0.082















































and the significance thereof, i.e., the significance of the






and the significance thereof, i.e., the significance of the
factor B (Sequence) effect.
The results of the processing of data through the ANOVA
sub-program of SPSS are presented in Table XI and are discussed
in the Analysis Section, below.
2 . Data Analysis
The analysis of the data processed as described in the
Data Processing Section, above, consisted of culling the results
of the various SPSS sub-programs employed and discerning from
them their meaning as applicable to the research questions and
hypotheses on which the research was based. The analyses that
follow are keyed to the research questions and hypotheses form-
ulated above
.
a. Research Question: Does a credible universally re-
cognized set of measurable personality factors exist in the
current state of knowledge?
This research question required no analysis but did
require investigation. Such an investigation was conducted, as
discussed previously, and it was found that a credible, univer-
sally recognized set of measurable personality factors did exist
and was available for use in personality-factor assessment in the
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16PF Questionnaire. This questionnaire was used in assessing,
or measuring, the personalities of the participants in the re-
search.
b. Research Question: If a credible, universally re-
cognized set of measurable personality factors exists, then
what, if any, effects do these factors have on negotiation ef-
fectiveness?
To answer this question, the data in Tables VIII
through X were analyzed as follows:
(1) Analysis of Table VIII, Case #1 Price-Euyer
Participant 16PF Personality Factor Raw Score Correlations .
Table VIII, introduced above, presented the
correlations between the buyer participants' 16 personality
factors and the prices negotiated by those buyer-participants
for Case #1. For each 16PF factor, the table provided a descrip-
tion of the factor in layman terms, indentified the number of
pairs of factor-Case #1 price correlated, specified the correla-
tion coefficient resulting from the correlation, and stated
the probability associated with the correlation coefficient.
The correlation coefficient specified indicated the "goodness
of fit" of a linear regression line to the factor-score and
the Case #l-price data. In the case of a perfect fit, the
coefficient would acquire the value of +1.0 or -1.0 where the
sign of the correlation coefficient and that of the regression
coefficient were the same. A positive correlation would indi-
cate that the factor score and the Case #1 price tended to
increase or decrease together. A negative correlation coefficient
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would indicate that as the factor score became larger, the
Case #1 price tended to become smaller, or vice versa. Where
there was a poor fit of the regression line to the data, the
8 2
correlation coefficient tended to be close to zero. The
probability associated with each correlation coefficient indicated
the probability that the correlation coefficient produced from
the sample data collected resulted from sample variability or
chance and not from the strength of the association of the
8 3two variables; thereby, the probability thus reported pro-
vided information for use in determining whether to accept or
reject the correlation coefficient as an indicator of the rela-
tionship between the two variables. (The probabilities were
derived from the use of the Student's t with N-2 degrees of
84freedom for the computed quantity.)
An inspection of the data contained in Table
VIII resulted in finding no factor-Case #1 price correlation
significant except that correlation of the dull-vs . -bright
scores, i.e., the buyers' intelligence scores, and the Case #1
prices. The coefficient of that correlation was -0.5777 with a
probability of .001 and indicated that as the buyers' intelli-
gence scores increased, the price negotiated by the buyers for
Case #1 decreased or vice versa. The intelligence factor-Case
#1 price correlation was considered even more significant than
the face value of probability indicated because the correlation
emerged without any conscious consideration or control of the
intelligence of the sellers with whom the buyers were negotiating.
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(2) Analysis of Table IX, Case #1-Case #2 Price
Differences - Buyer Participant 16PF Personality Factor Raw Score
Correlations .
Table IX presented the correlations between
the buyer-participants' 16 personality factors and the price
differences produced by those buyer-participants in negotiating
Case #1 and Case #3. Table IX, then, was identical in structure
to Table VIII except that in Table IX the difference between the
prices negotiated for the two role-playing cases was the object
under consideration instead of the prices negotiated for a single
role-playing case. An inspection of the data contained in
Table IX resulted in finding, at the .044 level of significance,
a correlation coefficient of 0.3277 for the correlation of
factor Q-, and the price difference. This correlation indicated
that those buyers who tended to be experimental, liberal, and
free-thinking, or characterized by radicalism, tended to im-
prove their performance less from Case #1 to Case #2 than those
buyers who tended to be conservative and respectful of tradi-
tional ideas, or characterized by conservatism of temperament.
Other than this correlation, no factor-price difference was
found to be statistically significant at the .05 level or better.
(3) Analysis of Table X: Correlation of Buyer-
Seller Personality Similarity with Case #1 Prices, Case *2
Prices, and Case #1 Price - Case #2 Price Differences .
Table X presented: first, the correlations
of the 16 personality-factor scores of the buver and the 16
personality-factor scores of the seller in each buyer-seller
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negotiation pair, i.e., a correlation coefficient for each
buyer-seller pair representing the similarity or dissimilarity
of their personalities; second, the correlation of the buyer-
seller similarity coefficients with the prices negotiated for
Case #1; third, the correlation of the buyer-seller similarity
i
coefficients with the prices negotiated for Case #2; and finally,
the correlation of the buyer-seller similarity coefficients v/ith
the price differences between the prices negotiated for Case #1
and the prices negotiated for Case #2. Upon inspection of these
results, it was noted that among the 28 buyer-seller pairs there
were eight significant buyer-seller personality correlations at
the five percent level. All were in the similar direction, as
was the trend among the remaining 20 pairs. In other words,
except for the 03-31 buyer-seller pair, all pairs were in the
range of not dissimilar to highly similar, thus indicating
that the entire sample of 4 2 participants was a relatively
homogeneous group of individuals.
It was further noted that there was not any
significant correlation in: (1) the correlation of the correla-
tion coefficients representing buyer-seller similarity or
dissimilarity and the prices negotiated for Case #1; (2) the
correlation of the correlation coefficients representing buyer-
seller similarity or dissimilarity and the prices negotiated
for Case #2; or (3) the correlation of the correlation coef-
ficients representing buyer-seller similarity or dissimilarity
and the price differences between the prices negotiated for
Case #1 and the prices negotiated for Case #2.
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c. Hypothesis Ho: Mock, or simulated negotiation
employed by the buyer and not by the seller does not affect
negotiation effectiveness.
To test this hypothesis, the results of the analysis
of price-difference variance presented in Table XI were analyzed.
It was initially noted, without regard to significance, that
among the 14 iterations of the experiment, including both se-
quences, the experimental-group buyers (with preparatory mock
negotiation) produced a smaller mean price difference between
the price negotiated for Case #1 and the price negotiated for
Case #2 than did the control-group buyers (without preparatory
mock negotiation) . The difference between the mean price dif-
ferences produced by the two groups was $666.69 ($289,765.25 -
$289,098.56) and indicated, again without regard to significance,
the effect of the mock-negotiation variable on the outcome of
Case #2, considering the baseline difference in negotiator abi-
lity between the experimental-group and control-group buyers.
It was additionally noted, upon examination of the cell means,
that in the seven iterations of the experiment in which Sequence
A applied (where the seller-competition facing the two buyers
was biased in favor of the experimental-group buyers in that the
seller had already negotiated each case with the experimental-
group buyer when he negotiated with the control-group buyer)
,
the mean price difference produced by the experimental-group
buyers was lower by $25,544.13 ($303,071.38 - $277,527.25)
than that produced by the control-group buyers. Still, without
regard to significance, the $25,544.13 difference between the
two groups in favor of the experimental-group buyers might he
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said to have resulted from the effect of the mock negotiation,
in part, and from the effect of the bias, in complementary
part.
Similarly, it was noted that in the seven itera-
tions of the experiment in which Sequence B applied (where the
seller competition facing the two buyers was complementarily
biased in favor of the control-group buyers) , the mean price
difference produced by the experimental-group buyers was
$24,240.68 higher ($300,699.81 - $276,459.13) than that pro-
duced by the control-group buyers. Among the iterations of
the experiment in which Sequence B was followed, then, it
might be said that the effect of the bias in favor of the con-
trol group overwhelmed and rendered unrecognizable the effect
of the mock negotiation, if any.
Finally, it was noted in the examination of the
cell means that the mean price difference produced by those
experimental- and control-group buyers following Sequence A
was $1,734.81 higher ($290,299.31 - $288,564.50) than that
produced by those experimental- and control-group buyers fol-
lowing Sequence B. This $1,734.81 difference suggested that
although the biases introduced in the experiment affected those
buyers following the two sequences, respectively, somewhat
differently, the effects on those buyers' performances, re-
spectively, were fairly equivalent, i.e., introducing bias in
favor of the experimental-group buyers in 50 percent of the
iterations of the experiment was compensated fairly equivalently
by introducing bias in favor of the control-group buyers in the
complementary 50 percent of the iterations.

Next, in the analysis of the results presented in
Table XI, the analysis of variance of the price differences
was examined. Initially, it was noted that the "main effects"
were not significant at any acceptable level of significance,
thus indicating that the factors of group (and, therefore mock
negotiation) , sequence, and the interaction thereof in combina-
tion produced no effect on the criterion variable, price dif-
8 5ference. Next, it was noted that the interaction effect of
group and sequence on price difference was significant at the
.08 level of significance, thus suggesting that the effect of
the group factor could have varied from one category of sequence
to the other and vice versa, i.e., the group following the se-
quence biased in favor of that group performed better than the
other group. Next, it was noted that neither the effect of
the group factor (mock negotiation) nor the effect of the se-
quence factor on the price difference was significant at any
acceptable level of significance, thus indicating, in sum ger-
mane to the research, that there was no difference in the price
negotiated in Case #2 between those experimental-group buyers
who engaged in preparatory mock negotiation and those control-
group buyers who did not, considering the baseline difference
between the two buyers in each iteration. This indication was
based on the rationale for analysis of variance that, intui-
tively, if the variation in the means of the categories of the
group factor and the sequence factor is less than the variations
in the price difference within the categories of the group fac-
tor and the sequence factor, respectively, then the effects of
g c
group and sequence factors tend to be nil.
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Finally, in the analysis of the results presented
in Table XI, the "Multiple Classification Analysis" produced
87
by the ANOVA sub-program was examined. In this portion of
Table XI, the grand mean of all of the price differences ob-
served was stated; and the number of price differences in each
category was given. The "unadjusted" columns presented the de-
viation of each category of the two factors from the grand mean
without adjustment for other factors or for covariates and the
"ETA" for each factor which, when squared, indicated the pro-
portion of variation in the price difference explained by the
factor that it represented. The group factor, for example, ex-
plained only .01% of the total variation in the price differences,
and the sequence factor explained only .04% of the total varia-
tion in the price difference. The "adjusted" columns presented
the deviation of each category from the grand mean when adjust-
ment had been made for the other factor and the "Beta" for each
factor, which, in both cases in this analysis of variance was
equivalent to the "ETA's" in the "Unadjusted" columns. In ad-
dition to the deviations, the "ETA's" and the "BETA'S," the
2
multiple classification analysis provided a "Multiple R ,
"
which indicated the overall relationship between the criterion
variable, price difference, and the independent variables,
group and sequence, i.e., the group and sequence factors
jointly explained 0.1% of the total variation in the price
8 8difference. ' In summary, the multiple classification anal-
ysis indicated that: between the two groups, the experimental
group buyers produced, on the average, a price difference which
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was $333 less than the grand mean of price differences; and
the control-group buyers produced, on the average, a price
difference which was $333 more than the grand mean of the price
difference; between the two sequences, the experimental-and-
control-group buyers following Sequence A produced, on the
average, a price difference which was $8 67 more than grand
mean of the price difference, and the experimental-and-control-
group buyers following Sequence B produced on the average a
price difference which v/as $8 67 less than the grand mean of the
price difference; and, together, the two factors of group and





The conclusions resulting from the research are based on
investigations conducted and on the analyses of the data col-
lected during the research and presented in Tables VI and VII.
These conclusions are stated below in association with the re-
search questions and hypotheses to which they pertained.
A. THE EFFECT OF PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS ON NEGOTIATION
EFFECTIVENESS
1. Research Question: Does a credible, universally recog-
nized set of measurable personality factors exist in the current
state of knowledge?
a. Conclusion
A credible, universally recognized set of measurable
personality factors does exist in the current state of knowledge.
b. Comment on Conclusion
This finding was based primarily on reviews of
personality assessment contained in The Sixth Mental Measure-
ment Yearbook and, in particular, the comment included therein
that the 16PF "May well be the best personality inventory there
8 9is." This is not to say that the 16PF is a complete inventory
of personality characteristics nor is it to say that the 16PF
Questionnaire is free from flaws or without peer, as the re-
90
views m the yearbook clearly point out. Rather, the 16PF
was found to be a credible , universally recognized set of meas-
urable personality factors suitable for use in assessing the
91personality characteristics of contract negotiators.
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2. Research Question: If a credible, universally recog-
nized set of measurable personality factors exists, then what,
if any, effects do these factors have on negotiation effective-
ness?
a. Conclusions
The personality-factor scores representing the
intelligence of each of the buyers correlated reasonably well
(-0.5777) with the price negotiated for Case #1 regardless of
the intelligence of the seller with whom the buyer negotiated,
i.e., the higher the intelligence score of the buyer, the lower
the price negotiated and vice versa. None of the remaining 15
personality-factor scores correlated significantly with the
price negotiated.
With respect to buyer personality factors - price
difference correlations, none of the personality-factor scores
of the buyers correlated significantly at any acceptable level
with the price differences except the correlation of the con-
servative-vs-experimental-factor scores and the price differ-
ences. That particular correlation produced a coefficient of
0.3277, significant at the .044 level, and indicated that those
buyers who tended to be experimental tended to improve their
performances less than those buyers who tended to be con-
servative.
Finally, buyer-seller personality similarity-
dissimilarity was found not to correlate significantly with
either the prices negotiated for Case #1, the prices negoti-
ated for Case #2, or the price differences between the prices
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negotiated for Case #1 and Case #2. This, however, may have
been due in part to the fact that buyer-seller pairs in this
sample tended to be quite similar to each other.
b. Comment on Conclusions
These conclusions suggested that other unknown
variables affect the price negotiated more than the personality
factors of the buyer and that buyer-seller pairs in actual
negotiations tend to share similar personality characteristics.
Perhaps, as inferred by Procurement Associates, Inc., the de-
92gree of negotiator preparation produces the greatest effect.
Therefore, in the selection of the negotiators, the findings
of this research did not support any emphasis beyond that cur-
rently directed by the Department of Defense.
B. THE EFFECT OF PREPARATORY MOCK NEGOTIATION ON NEGOTIATION
EFFECTIVENESS
1. Research hypothesis Ko : Mock, or simulated, negotia-
tion employed by the buyer and not by the seller does not affect
negotiation effectiveness.
a. Conclusion
The null hypothesis should be accepted, based on
the results of the analysis of variance.
b. Comment on Conclusion
Although the experimental-group buyers did pro-
duce a mean price difference smaller than that of the control-
group buyers, thus indicating superficially that mock negoti-
ation did favorably affect the negotiation outcomes, the differ-
ence between the two means of the two groups, respectively, was
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statistically insignificant; and although segments of the total
sample were analyzed separately, the results of the analysis
of the total sample were necessarily the only ones fully mean-
ingful, i.e., it was necessary to consider both sequences A
and B in the analysis of the results of the total experiment to
ensure the counterbalancing of the biases introduced in the ex-
periment. In sum, acceptance of the null hypothesis indicated
that engaging in mock negotiation did not affect negotiation
outcome
.
2 . The Alternate Hypotheses
The null hypothesis was found to be acceptable; therefore,
any testing of the alternate hypotheses was unnecessary.
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VI. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. THE EFFECT OF PERSONALITY SIMILARITY/DISSIMILARITY ON
NEGOTIATION EFFECTIVENESS
1. Comments
The data collected, processed, and analyzed during this
research indicated no significant correlation between an in-
dividual negotiator's personality characteristics (except
possibly intelligence and conservatism) and negotiation out-
come. Additionally, the processing of these data produced no
significant correlation between the correlation coefficient
representing the similarity of the personalities of the buyer-
and- seller pairs and negotiation outcome. However, as indicated
in the Analysis Section, there was so much personality homo-
geneity, i.e., similarity, among the participants in the ex-
periment that finding a correlation between buyer-seller person-
ality similarity-dissimilarity and negotiation outcomes was
rendered unlikely due to the absence of a sufficient number of
dissimilar buyer-seller pairs. Therefore, it can be suggested
neither that personality characteristics should, nor that they
should not, be accorded more emphasis in the selection of De-
partment of Defense contract negotiators than that currently
directed. Nor can it be suggested that attempting to produce,
through the selection of negotiators, any particular buyer-
seller personality mix would or would not result in improved
negotiation outcomes. These suggestions must await research
findings that are more nearly conclusive.
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In light of the inconclusive results of the instant
research, the suggestions of Rubin and Brown, discussed pre-
viously, that the combination of the buyer's interpersonal
orientation, his motivational orientation, and his power in
relation to that combination of the seller's such orientations
and power does affect negotiation effectiveness significantly,
continue to provide intuitive appeal.
Although personality characteristics, when isolated,
appeared to have little or no impact on negotiation effective-
ness, it may be, as Rubin and Brown suggested, that in combina-
tion with the motivational orientation and power of the two
parties to the negotiation, personality characteristics do
affect negotiation outcome, as would intuitively seem probable.
2. Suggestions for Further Research
In view of the results of the instant study and the in-
tuitive appeal of the Rubin and Brown discussion, it is suggested
that research as to what impact the interpersonal orientation,
motivational orientation, and power of each of the parties to
contract negotiation, in combination, have on negotiation
effectiveness be conducted. Additionally, it is suggested that
further research be conducted to determine conclusively what,
if any, effect buyer-seller-personality similarity-dissimilarity
has on negotiation outcome -- research including buyer-seller
pairs with similar and dissimilar personalities.
B. THE VALUE OF MOCK NEGOTIATION AS A PREPARATION TECHNIQUE
11. Comments
This research indicated, in the acceptance of the null
hypothesis, that mock negotiations as a preparation technique
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did not significantly affect the actual negotiation outcome.
However, acceptance of the null hypothesis in this research
does not indicate that mock negotiation as a preparation tech-
nique is without value; rather, acceptance indicates only
that the results are inconclusive and that the outcomes ob-
served might have resulted from: the negotiation cases having
been unrealistic; distortions caused by the time constraints
imposed; distortions caused by the differences in the physical
settings in which the experiment was conducted; the homogeneity
of the participants sampled; or other factors. Therefore,
mock negotiation as a preparation technique may or may not in
fact affect negotiation outcome, but conclusions pertaining
thereto must await the results of further research.
In a practical sense, the question as to whether the
buyer's engaging in preparatory mock negotiations affected
negotiation outcome might have appeared to be trivial. Cer-
tainly, it could be argued that if the buyer's engaging in pre-
paratory mock negotiations resulted in his negotiating a signi-
ficantly lower price, then the seller could surely employ the
same method of preparation and, thereby, nullify any advantage
that the buyer might have acquired by engaging in preparatory
mock negotiations. Although such nullification seemed to the
researcher to be plausible and, under such circumstances as
described, probable, the question arose as to whether mock
negotiation was superior to other methods of preparation, such
as individual preparation, preparation including pre-negotiation
clearance, or approval, of strategy and position by higher
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authority, and preparation including "murder-boarding." The
instant research addressed the question as to whether prepara-
tory mock negotiation was superior to individual preparation
alone—the type of preparation employed by the control-group
buyers—and indicated that mock negotiation, in addition to
individual preparation, resulted in neither better nor worse
negotiation outcome; it did not include a comparison of pre-
paratory mock negotiation, pre-negotiation clearance, or
approval, by higher authority, and "murder-boarding."
2 . Suggestions for Further Research
In light of the results of the instant research and
the comments above, it is suggested that research as to which,
if any, method of preparation for negotiation is most effective
be conducted. Included in such research might be a comparison
of mock negotiation, pre-negotiation clearance, or approval







LARRY LYON, DIRECTOR OF MARKETING, SPARK ELECTRONICS CO.
Your company manufactures, among other major products, galva-
nometers which you have sold to prime contractors and upper-
tier subcontractors and to commercial firms, as well. Recently
you received an RFP from the Air Force for 1000 galvanometers
identical to a new model which you previously have sold in a
quantity of 200 at a price of $150 each, only to Short Electric
Co., a major prime contractor. Incident to the RFP, the Air
Force has requested that you submit cost and pricing data.
You have just been through an audit relating to the establish-
ment of a negotiated final overhead rate for the previous year
for use on your cost-type contracts. (See Exhibit I.) Addi-
tionally, you have accurate information concerning labor and
material costs available from the previous procurement by Short
of the 2 00 galvanometers.
On the first proposal to Short, you had included a burden rate
of 157%; however, as a result of reduction in business, your
most recent audited manufacturing burden rate was 212.6%.
Your "Customer Service Expense" audited rate was 2.5 5%; however,
the auditor had disallowed approximately 7 5% of these expenses,
including advertising, salaries, commission and expenses in con-
nection with the salesmen.
Your "General and Administrative Expense" audited rate was 8.06%
after the auditor had eliminated contributions, patent expenses,
credit and collection expenses, and bad debts amounting to
$15,600.
Using these rates, the total unit cost on the previous contract
was only $82.20. (See Exhibit II.)
In your effort to price the proposal for thelOOO units for the
Air Force, considerable discussion arose among the management




a. The galvanometer was a new, improved model. The Air
Force had requested the RFP . Within reasonable limits, the com-
pany could assume that it will be the only bidder.
b. The volatile nature of the company's business prospects
because of the effects of the Vietnam War and energy prices on
the defense budget.
c. The fact that all economic indicators forecast strong
inflationary pressures on wages and prices.
After analysis of the above factors, plus the cost projections
furnished by the financial department, you submitted a price
of $140.99 per unit. (See Exhibit II.) Your position in the
forthcoming negotiation with the Air Force is as follows:
a. Purchased parts. Your projected cost of $1.67 per unit
is based on the previous actual unit cost of $1.52 plus a 10%
increase. The increase is based on your prediction of increased
prices resulting from the copper strike, recent inflationary
increases in steel, wage increases in the automobile industry,
and statements by the President.
b. Raw material. Same as purchased parts, above.
c. Labor. Your direct labor-hour projections are based on
previous actual unit costs. The labor rate of $2.09 per hour is
based on actual labor rates for previous production of the same
item factored by a 10% increase projected at the estimated mid-
point of the effort of the proposed work. The estimated 10%
wage increase is based on Spark's prediction of increased costs
based on: an analysis of the recent inflationary wage increases
granted in the automobile industry; statements by national union
leaders that they intend to press for high wage and fringe bene-
fit increases; and statements by the President warning of runa-
way inflation in the event taxes are not increased.
d. Manufacturing overhead rate. The manufacturing overhead
rate is based on Spark's projection of increased overhead costs
and decreased labor during the current fiscal year, computed as
follows
:
1. Calculation of manufacturing overhead increases:
(a) Manufacturing overhead last year
Salaries and wages $173,136
Other overhead 178, 293
Total manufacturing overhead $3 51,429
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(b) Projected Mfg. Ovhd. current FY
Salaries and wages $190,449 ($173,135 + 10% inc.)
Other overhead 187,207 ($178,293 + 5% inc.)
Total $377,656
(c) Labor Base: $132,216. The labor base for the
current fiscal year is based on your projection of a 20% decline
from your previous fiscal year base of $165,27 in the amount of
direct labor based on a decline in business and a change in
labor/material mix of your contracts.





Manufacturing overhead rate 28 5.6%
e. Packaging. See subparagraphs a, b, and c, above.
f. Customer service.
1. Total customer service expense: $88,902. This rate
is based on a projection based on your total customer expense of
$81,391 for last fiscal year plus an estimated 8% increase in
these costs which are composed primarily of labor.
2. Projected material base for the current fiscal year:
$151,956. This is based on a projected 10% increase in material
costs (See subparagraphs a, b, and c, above.) and an estimated
10% increase in material usage due to expected change in the mix
of work. This rationale is consistent with the projected drop
in direct labor. (See subparagraph d, above.)




Mfg. Ovhd. costs 377,656
Cost of goods manufactured $661,828
rate
:
4. Calculation of projected customer service expense
Customer service expense $ 88,902
Cost of goods manufactured $661,828 = i "j - 4 °
g. General and administrative expense. This rate is based
on a projection of the total G & A expense for the last year of
$60,516 (including the $8600 disallowed by the auditor) adjusted
for salary increases and projected changes in the allocation
base, computed as follows:
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2. Projected G&A current fiscal year:
Salaries and Wages $ 36,875 ($33,523
+ 10% inc.)
Other $ 28,342 ($26,993
+ 10% inc.)
Total $ 65,217
3. Calculation of G&A rate:
Projected G&A expense $ 65,217
_ po
Projected cost of goods mfgd $661,823 =
h. Profit: 15% of total costs based on weighted guidelines.
Thus, with your negotiation position firmly in mind, you depart
your office to negotiate with David Lamb, the Air Force's negoti-
ator for this acquisition.




Following is a listing of the audited Material Costs (Sched-
ule I) , Manufacturing Overhead (Schedule II) , Customer Service
Expense (Schedule III) , and General and Administrative Expense
(Schedule IV)
:
SCHEDULE I - MATERIAL COSTS
Material Costs (Year Ending 7/31/XY)

























































































Indirect Expenses - The totals include provision for anticipated
increases of: 5% indirect wage and salary rates; vacation pay;
depreciation due to new plant and equipment; etc. It also in-





SCHEDULE III - CUSTOMER SERVICE EXPENSE









TOTAL $ 16,3 91
Cost of Goods Manufactured (Material +
Labor + Mfg O.K.) $643,329
Customer Service Rate 2.55-
NOTE: Customer Service Expenses - The instrument portion has
been reduced approximately $65,000 by the auditor for items
classified as not-allowable. These include commissions, ad-
vertising, salary and expenses of the salesmen, etc.
SCHEDULE IV - GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE
















Cost of Goods Manufactured $643 ,329
G&A Rate 8. 06%
NOTE: General and Administrative Expenses - Items eliminated
from this classification of accounts totaled $8,600 for contri-





SPARK'S PROPOSAL (COST PROJECTION)







































SOURCE: This case was adapted principally and liberally from
Procurement Associates, Inc., Government Prime Contracts
and Subcontracts Service (Covina, CA : Procurement







DAVID LAMB, NEGOTIATOR, USAF
Recently, you sent out an RFP for 1000 galvanometers identical to a
new model, only 200 of which previously had been sold, at a unit
price of $150, by Spark Electronics Co. to Short Electric Co.,
a major prime contractor. As a part of your RFP, you requested
submittal of cost and pricing data (DD Form633)
.
In response to your proposal, only one company, Spark Electronics
Co., submitted a bid at a price of $140.99 per unit. (See Ex-
hibit I.) Spark is a company which, among other major products,
manufactures galvanometers. They have sold galvanometers to
prime contractors and upper-tier subcontractors and to commercial
firms. Although other firms are capable of manufacturing the
galvanometer desired, Spark is the only company that responded
to the RFP and has produced it to date; and, accordingly, you
have justified negotiating with Spark as a sole source. It is
anticipated that a firm fixed-price contract will result from
your negotiation.
As good fortune would have it, you know that Spark has just been
through an audit relating to the establishment of a negotiated
final overhead rate for the previous year for use on its cost-
type contracts. (See Exhibit II.) you know, additionally, that
Spark's "Customer Service Expense" audited rate was 2.55%, and
that the auditor had disallowed approximately 7 5% of these ex-
penses including advertising, salaries, commissions, and expenses
in connection with the salesmen. Moreover, the "General and
Administrative Expense" audited rate was 8.06% after the auditor
had eliminated contributions, patent expenses, credit and collec-
tion expenses, and bad debts amounting to $15,600. Using these
rates, the total unit cost on Spark's previous contract with
Short was only $82.20. (See Exhibit I.)
After receipt of Spark's proposal, the auditor reviewed the con-
tractor's cost records to manufacture the original 200 galvano-
meters. He found that the costs were as stated but disagreed
with Spark's projections in their entirety. After reviewing the
auditor's comments and Spark's proposal, you and the price analyst
have arrived at a unit price objective of $51.00, supported as
follows (See Exhibit I.)
:
a. Purchased parts. This 5% overall reduction is based on
your assumption that an increase in quantity from 2 00 to 1000
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should result in a substantial reduction (10% or more) on some
of the purchased parts. Taking into account possible inflationary
increases, this averages out at 5% overall.
b. Raw material. This is a 3% increase in recognition of
possible material increases. Taking into account that Spark will
be able to order the material immediately upon award of the con-
tract, you consider this an adequate contingency.
c. Labor. The labor hours are based on the previous actual
unit costs extended through 1000 units on an 8 0% improvement
curve (learning curve) . The $2 per hour rate is based on the
historical rate factored by a 5% increase. This increase recog-
nizes the possibility of a wage increase.
d. Manufacturing overhead rate. The manufacturing overhead
rate is based on your assumption that Spark's volume will remain
approximately the same. Indirect labor and certain other costs
are factored for possible increases. Certain design engineering
costs are deleted. No design engineering is required by the
contract; therefore, you do not believe these costs are allocable.
Your calculation of manufacturing overhead increases is as follows
(1) Manufacturing overhead last year:
Salaries and wages $173,136
Other overhead 178,293
Total manufacturing ovhd $351,429
(2) Projected manufacturing overhead current fiscal year:
Salaries and wages $173,136




Other overhead 183,641 ($178,293 +3%)
Total $316,809
This calculation provides for a 5% increase in allocable overhead
salaries and a 3% increase in other costs.
(3) Labor base: $173,533. This is based on your assump-
tion that the contractor's labor base for the current year will
be essentially the same as the previous year's $165,270 plus 5%
for expected wage increases.
(4) Projected overhead rate based on subparagraphs (1),
(2) , and (3) , above
:
Manufacturing overhead $316,8 09
Labor $173,533
Manufacturing ovhd rate 182.6%




(1) Total customer service expense: $16,746. This is
based on the amount of customer service expense accepted by the
auditor for the previous year ($16,391) factored by a 5% in-
crease for the labor portion (7083 x 5% = $354.15)
(2) Projected material base for the current fiscal year:
$130,429. This is based on your assumption that Spark's material
costs for the current fiscal year will be the same as the last
fiscal year with the addition of a 3% factor to cover possible
material increases.




Manufacturing overhead costs 316,8 09
Cost of goods manufactured $620,771
(4) Calculation of projected customer service expense
rate :
Customer service expense $ 16,746
Cost of goods manufactured 5620,771
f. General and administrative Expense. This rate is based
on the total G&A for Spark's previous fiscal year of $51,916
factored for expected increases. You do not include $3600 dis-
allowed by the auditor for Spark's previous fiscal year on the
basis that the items dc not contribute to, and, therefore,
should not be allocated to, this contract.




(2) Projected G&A current fiscal year:
Salaries and wages $ 35,119 ($33,523
+ 5%)
Other $ 18,945 ($18,395
+ 3%)
Total $ 54,064
This is based on your assumption that Spark's G&A costs are com-




(3) Calculation of G&A rate:
Projected G&A expense $ 54,064 „ 7?
Projected cost of goods mfgd. $620,771
h. Profit: 12% of total costs based on weighted guide-
lines.
Thus, with your negotiation position clearly in mind, you await
the arrival of Larry Lyon, Director of Marketing, Spark Elec-
tronics Co.




SPARK'S PROPOSAL (COST PROJECTION)
SPARK'S PREVIOUS COSTS (FOR 200 EACH)




COST PROJECTION UNIT COSTS PROJECTIONS
Purchased Parts $ 1.67 $ 1.529 $ 1.46
Other Raw Materials 3.11 2.834 2.92
Direct Labor 24.45 (11.7 22.281(11.7 12.80 (6.4










69.82(285.6%) 47.3 69(212.6%) 23.37(182.6%)
.34 .310 .34
$ 99.39 $74,323 $40.89
13.44(13.4%) 1.895(2.55%) 1.10(2.7%)










Following is a listing of the audited Material Costs (Schedule
I) , Manufacturing Overhead (Schedule II) , Customer Service Expense
(Schedule III) , and General And Administrative Expense (Schedule
IV) :
SCHEDULE I - MATERIAL COSTS
Material Costs (Year Ending 3/31/XY)

























































































Indirect Expenses - The totals includ
increases of: 5% indirect wage and s
depreciation due to new plant and equ
anticipated decreases in property tax
e provision for anticipated
alary rates; vacation pay;






Exhibit II (Continued )
SCHEDULE III - CUSTOMER SERVICE EXPENSE








Other " 1, 994
Total $ 16,391
Cost of Goods Manufactured
(Material + Labor + Mfg. O.H.) $643,329
Customer Service Rate 2.55%
NOTE: Customer Service Expenses - The instrument portion has
been reduced approximately $65,000 by the auditor for items
classified as not-allowable. These include commissions, ad-
vertising, salary and expenses of the salesmen, etc.
SCHEDULE IV - GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE
















Cost of Goods Manufactured $643 ,329"
G&A Rate 8 . 06%
NOTE: General and Administrative Expenses - Items eliminated from
this classification of accounts totaled $8,600 for contributions,
patent expenses, credit and collection expenses, and bad debts.
SOURCE: This case was adapted principally and liberally from Pro-
curement Associates, Inc., Government Prime Contracts and Sub-
contracts Service (Covina, CA: Procurement Associates, Inc
.
, 1973)















Role for Richard Raymond
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Role for Ray Grant 108




There is a growing belief that the use of mock or
simulated negotiations prior to entering actual negotiations
may result in the negotiation of a more satisfactory agree-
ment. Trial lawyers and labor unions have used this approach
for many years. At least one leading government supplier is now
using this technique while preparing to negotiate with repre-
sentatives of government. In 1972 the author directed graduate
research in an effort to determine the effect of conducting mock
negotiations. One of the major problems encountered in this re-
search was the absence of a well constructed, realistic scenario
on which to base negotiations.
In preparation for participation as a faculty member at the
1974 Purchasing/Logistics Seminar cosponsored by Stanford Uni-
versity ard the National Association of Purchasing Management,
I prepared the following mock negotiation case, "Apex Aviation."
All of the participants who played the role of the buyer from the
Stanford Seminar and graduate students at the Air Force Institute
of Technology who used the case in the summer of 197 4 agreed
that the mock negotiation experience was very helpful in pre-
paring for the actual negotiations. Those individuals who played
the role of the buyer's supervisor or of the seller indicated
that they gained considerable insight into negotiating.
In addition to introducing the concept of mock negotiations,
the Apex Aviation Company may be used as a teaching aid to help
buyers or purchasing students gain experience in negotiation.
Logically, the use of the case should be preceded by sessions
dealing with (1) the relation between uncertainty and selection
of the right type of contract pricing arrangement and (2) negoti-




The mechanics of presenting the Apex case follow. The
class or group should be divided into three subgroups. One
subgroup will be assigned the role of Richard Raymond, buyer.
The second subgroup will be assigned the role of Ray Grant,
Director of Commodities for Apex, and Raymond's boss. The
third subgroup is assigned the role of Ralph Hawk, the prospective
supplier. Each role player is given information relevant to his
role, Raymond's (buyer) information being identified as 10 3
through 10 7 , Grant's (Raymond's boss) 108 through 115 , and Hawk's
(prospective supplier) 114 through 116 . Ideally, the role players
should be assigned their roles and provided with the required
material one or more days prior to conducting the negotiations.
All role players should be directed not to discuss their roles
with individuals with a different role. There is no objection
to individuals with the same role (e.g., all Raymonds) working
together to prepare for negotiations. In fact, such action is
probably beneficial.
Although a time constraint may be viewed as somewhat artifi-
cial, the role players should be requested to complete the mock
negotiations in forty-five minutes, with a similar amount of
time allocated to the actual negotiations. Fifteen to thirty
minutes should be available for the instructor or discussion
leader to conduct the discussion following the actual negotiations.
Experience in the use of role-playing techniques indicates
that there is a synergistic effect from having several discus-
sions conducted simultaneously in the same area. Many role
players will ask to be permitted to conduct their negotiations in
a separate room. You are encouraged to insist that all discussions
take place in the same room.
Due to the sequential nature of this process, those indivi-
duals who are playing the role of Hawk (seller) will be free dur-
ing the mock negotiation between Raymond (buyer) and his boss,
Grant. It is recommended that the Hawks meet together as a group
during the mock and discuss details and strategies since most
will be unfamiliar with the role of seller. Such a procedure
serves two purposes: (1) it makes the individuals playing the
role of Hawk more comfortable in the role of seller and (2) it
avoids any dissonance which might occur if the Hawks were idle
during the mock negotiations.
As soon as the mock negotiations have been completed, or
forced due to time constraints to terminate, or at the next
class or session, depending on the length of time available,
the "actual" negotiation between Raymond and Hawk should take
place. The instructor has the choice of dismissing the individ-
uals playing Grant's role during the negotiation or of having
Grant sit in on the actual negotiation as a non-participating




On completion of the "actual" negotiation, the instructor
should lead a group discussion. The following questions are
suggested
:
1. T*7hat negotiating strategy did Raymond use?
2. How did Raymond gather information?
3
.
How did Raymond deal with uncertainty on the tooling?
(If Hawk is unwilling to base his cost for the tooling on
approximately 3100 hours, his estimate for the most likely
number of hours, then a fixed price incentive or even cost plus
incentive fee contract is usually appropriate for this portion
of the work.
)
4. Who retains title to the tooling? (Since Apex is to
pay all costs, they should take title in order to avoid any
sole source situation on follow-on purchases.)
5. Was a firm agreement reached on the delivery schedule?
6. What did Raymond learn during the mock? Did he change
objectives and/or strategies? Did he become psychologically
better prepared to enter actual negotiations?
One final thought is offered for your consideration: it is
contended that the ability to think as one's opponent is a
highly desirable attribute for a negotiator. What would happen
if the buyer were to role-play the part of the seller during
the mock negotiation before entering actual negotiations?
*
The term "actual" is applied to the negotiation conducted by
the individual role-playing the part of the buyer and another
individual role-playing the part of the seller.
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THE APEX AVIATION CASE
Background
The Apex Aviation Company is a leading supplier of mech-
anical subsystems to the aviation industry with annual sales
of $300,000,000. The firm is in a highly competitive industry
with four firms supplying approximately 80% of all mechanical
subsystems to the aircraft manufacturers. Typically, Apex re-
ceives a functional or performance specification from an aircraft
manufacturer for a subsystem or component and then engineers
the design of the required item or subsystem. Due to the cy-
clical nature of the industry, Apex frequently subcontracts for
the manufacture of items and then assembles the items in its
own plants.
Recently Apex received a follow-on order for 100 landing
gears. The initial order had been for 100 landing gears, de-
livery of which was completed 3 months ago. Due to heavy plant
loading and following a review by the Apex make-or-buy committee,
it has been decided to have the machining of the aluminum outer
cylinder struts subcontracted with the aluminum ingots supplied
by Apex.
The procurement has been assigned to Mr. Raymond of the
Purchasing Department. Mr. Raymond has sent Requests for Pro-
posals (RFP) to a number of qualified vendors. Copies of the
design specification accompanied the RFP . The RFP called for
a delivery schedule to commence six months after award of con-
tract with 10 struts to be delivered per month over a 10 month
period.
This case was prepared by Associate Professor David M. Bur:
Copyright c 1974 by /s/ David N. Burt /s/.
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Role for Richard Raymond, Buyer
On receipt of a properly prepared purchase request together
with specifications for 100 landing outer cylinder struts, you
developed a Request for Proposal which was sent to 23 machining
firms. Only three firms responded to the RFP and only one of
these appeared to be able to meet the required delivery schedule,
Calls to the two non-responsive proposers confirmed their in-
ability to meet the required delivery schedule.
Apex has had a continuing relationship with the only respon-
sive proposer, Hawk Manufacturing of San Mateo, California. Last
week you visited Hawk and performed a mini-pre-award survey
which convinced you that this source will be able to satisfy
your requirements, if awarded a contract.* A copy of Hawk's
proposal is attached.
In preparing for negotiations with Hawk, you requested Manu-
facturing Operations to estimate the number of manhours and cost
required to machine the outer cylinder struts. Manufacturing
Operations' response is included as attachment 107. In addi-
tion, you have checked on recently awarded contracts to the
machining industry to aid in development of a position on di-
rect hourly rates, overhead, G&A and profit. This information
is contained in attachment 106.
You are scheduled to meet with Mr. Hawk, owner of Hawk
Manufacturing Co., in your office tomorrow morning. This
afternoon you are to enter into mock negotiations with Mr.
Grant, Director of Commodities, the number two man in Apex's
purchasing office.
*
Since the machining industry is operating near capacity,
you carefully reviewed Hawk's schedule. You are satisfied
that Hawk will be able to meet your schedule. However, in-













Hawthorne, CA 902 5
Dear Mr. Raymond:
Reference is made to your Request for Proposal #29-74. We are
confident that we can meet all terms and conditions of your re-
quest for a total price of $480,800.
As we see the job, there are two components: (1) development of
special tooling and (2) production of the outer cylinder struts.
Based on our past experience, we estimate that the special tool-
ing will cost $191,000. If you would prefer, we will develop
special tooling on a time and materials approach. The hourly
rate, including overhead, G&A and profit will be $32.20 per hour.
We estimate material costs to be $70,000 including a 10% handling
charge.
The actual machining of the struts should take 100 hours per
strut. Out cost for this portion of the contract is as follows:
100 hours per strut, 100 struts; 10,000 hours
direct labor cost, at $9 per hour $ 90,000
overhead, 150% 135,000
total cost to manufacturer 225,000
G&A, 15% 33,750
Subtotal $258,750
Profit, 12% 31, 050
Total cost for struts $289,800
Special tooling 191, 000
Total $480,800
If awarded the contract, we will be able to begin work on the
special tooling immediately and on the production of the outer
sylinder struts in six months. We will be able to meet your
delivery schedule.
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Director of Manufacturing Operations
To: Richard Raymond,
Purchasing Department
Subj : Costs for Manufacturing Outer Cylinder Struts
During the past year, we machined 100 identical struts.* The
first strut required 100 hours. The entire job required 5000
hours. As with most other work of this nature, we experienced
an improvement curve of 90%.
The special tooling, which has since been converted to manufac-
ture of another job, required 3000 manhours of tool and die
makers' time. Their hourly rate is $10. Cost of materials
for the special tooling was $65,000.
Our make-or-buy committee has estimated that the total current
in-house cost of making the special tooling and machining the
struts would be $425000. This figure takes into consideration
the impact of incurring overtime, rescheduling other in-house




This was done on a single production line.
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THE APEX AVIATION CASE
Background
The Apex Aviation Company is a leading supplier of
mechanical subsystems to the aviation industry with annual
sales of $300,000,000. The firm is in a highly competitive
industry with four firms supplying approximately 8 0% of all
mechanical subsystems to the aircraft manufacturers. Typically,
Apex receives a functional or performance specification from
an aircraft manufacturer for a subsystem or component and
then engineers the design of the required item or subsystem.
Due to the cyclical nature of the industry, Apex frequently
subcontracts for the manufacture of items and then assembles
the items in its own plants.
Recently, Apex received a follow-on order for 100 landing
gears. The initial order had been for 100 landing gears,
delivery of which was completed 3 months ago. Due to heavy
plant loading and following a review by the Apex make-or-buy
committee, it has been decided to have the machining of the
aluminum outer cylinder struts subcontracted with the aluminum
ingots supplied by Apex.
The procurement has been assigned to Mr. Raymond of the
Purchasing Department. Mr. Raymond has sent Requests for
Proposals (RFP) to a number of qualified vendors. Copies of
the design specification accompanied the RFP. The RFP called
for a delivery schedule to commence 6 months after award of
contract with 10 struts to be delivered per month over a 10
month period.
This case was prepared by Associate Professor David N. Burt,
Copyright c 1974 by /s/ David N. Burt .
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Role for Ray Grant
Director of Commodities
Apex Purchasing Department
You are the Director of Commodity Purchases and the number
two man in the purchasing department. Approximately one year
ago you instituted the policy of requiring all commodity buyers
to conduct a mock negotiation with you before entering into
negotiations with the actual prospective supplier (s). This
requirement is limited to all purchases in excess of $100,000.
During this time you have discovered that your buyers frequently
fail to establish realistic negotiation objectives prior to
entering negotiations. Several of the buyers have been reluc-
tant to use other than the firm-fixed price contract when a
large degree of uncertainty is present. Further, not all buyers
have used the experience or learning curve when appropriate.
Your approach has been to role play the part of the pro-
spective supplier,* With this information in hand, you develop
the best case you can in support of the contractor's proposal.
You know from experience that most proposals are designed to
be low enough to be within the competitive range so that the
proposer will be included in negotiations. But you also know
that most suppliers are risk averse and tend to offer prices
which protect them from unforeseen events.
You are due to meet with Richard Raymond, one of your pur-
chasing agents, this afternoon. Mr. Raymond is scheduled to
meet with Mr. Hawk, owner of Hawk Manufacturing tomorrow. You
have a copy of Mr. Hawk's proposals, information on three simi-
lar procurements, information from your production department on
its recent experience with a similar production run and a memo
from Mr. Raymond on the competitive environment and Hawk's
ability to meet schedule to aid you in preparing to play his
role as a potential supplier of outer cylinder struts to Apex.
The information available to you includes a copy of the pro-
spective supplier's proposal and any additional relevant facts








SUBJECT: Preparation for Negotiations with Hawk Manufacturing Co.
In response to a purchase request for 100 landing outer cylinder
struts, a REquest for Proposal was sent to 23 machining firms.
Only three firms responded to the RFP and only one of these ap-
peared to be able to meet the required delivery schedule. Calls
to the two nonresponsive proposers confirmed their inability to
meet the required delivery schedule.
Apex has had a continuing relationship with the only responsive
proposer, Hawk Manufacturing of San Mateo, California. Last
week I visited Hawk and performed a mini -pre-award survey which
convinced me that this sourcer will be able to satisfy our re-
quirements, if a contract is awarded. Since the machining indus-
try is operating near capacity, I carefully reviewed Hawk's sched-
ule and am satisfied that he can meet our delivery requirements.
Award of our requirement to Hawk will bring his facilities to full















Reference is made to your Request for Proposal #29-74. We are
confident that we can meet all terms and conditions of your re-
quest for a total price of $480,800.
As we see the job, there are two components: (1) development of
special tooling and (2) production of the outer cylinder struts.
Based on our past experience, we estimate that the special tool-
ing will cost $191,000. If you would prefer, we will develop
special tooling on a time and materials approach. The hourly
rate, including overhead, G&A and profit will be $32.20 per hour.
We estimate material costs to be $7 0,000 including a 10% handling
charge.
The actual machining of the struts chould take 100 hours per strut,
Our cost for this portion of the contract is as follows:
100 hours per strut, 100 struts; 10,000 hours
direct labor cost, at $9 per hour $ 90,000
overhead, 150% 135,000
total cost to manufacturer 225,000
G&A, 15% 33,750
Subtotal 258,750
Profit, 12% 31, 050
Total cost for struts 289,800
Special Tooling 191, 000
Total $480,800
If awarded the contract, we will be able to begin work on the
special tooling immediately and on the production of the outer
cylinder struts in six months.
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Director of Manufacturing Operations
TO: Richard Raymond,
Purchasing Department
SUBJ : Costs for Manufacturing Outer Cylinder Struts
During the past year, we machined 100 identical struts.* The
first strut required 100 hours. The entire job required 5000
hours. As with most other work of this nature, we experienced
an improvement curve of 90%.
The special tooling, which has since been converted to manu-
facture of another job, required 3000 manhours of tool and die
makers' time. Their hourly rate is $10. Cost of materials for
the special tooling was $65,000.
Our make-or-buy committee has estimated that the total current
in-house cost of making the special tooling and machining the
struts would be $425,000. This figure takes into consideration
the impact of incurring overtime, rescheduling other in-house
work, and other costs incident to production overload.
/a/
David Jones
*This was done on a single production line.
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THE APEX AVIATION CASE
Background
The Apex Aviation Company is a leading supplier
of mechanical subsystems to the aviation industry with
annual sales of $300,000,000. The firm is in a highly
competitive industry with four firms supplying approximately
80% of all mechanical subsystems to the aircraft manufacturers.
Typically, Apex receives a functional or performance specifi-
cation from an aircraft manufacturer for a subsystem or com-
ponent and then engineers the design of the required item or
subsystem. Due to the cyclical nature of the industry, Apex
frequently subcontracts for the manufacture of items aid then
assembles the items in its own plants.
A few weeks ago, you received a Request for Proposal to
machine the aluminum outer cylinder struts for 100 landing
gears with the provision that the aluminum ingots would be
supplied by Apex.
Several days ago, Mr. Raymond, from Apex's Purchasing
Department, visited your plant to check on loading and capacity
You have had a continuing and satisfactory relationship with
Apex.
This case was prepared by Associate Professor David N. Burl
Copyright c 197 4 by /s/ David N. Burt.
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Role for Ralph Hawk
President
Hawk Manufacturing Co.
You recently submitted the attached proposal to the Apex
Aviation Company for machining outer cylinder struts. Your
proposal is composed of two elements: one for special tooling
and one for manufacturing.
Your estimate of the most likely number of hours required
to prepare the special tooling was 3100. You were fairly cer-
tain that no more than 4 00 hours would be required. Accordingly,
you used the value 3750 hours as a conservative, but realistic,
estimate. Your hourly rate for tool and die personnel, over-
head, G&A and profit rates are $10 per hour, 150%, 15% and
12%, respectively.
In order to estimate the amount of time required to manu-
facture an outer cylinder strut, you have one of your machinists
use soft tooling and actually produce a strut. It required 2 00
hours to produce the test strut. Based on past experience on
the relative efficiency of labor using hard tooling versus soft
tooling, you divided the required hours by two, giving you 100
hours if the test item had been produced using hard tooling.*
In other words, the most likely time required to produce the
first item using the special tooling and production line tech-
niques would be 100 hours. All of your rates are shown in the
proposal.
You would like to get this job since it complements your
present schedule. However, things are good in the machining
business and you feel reasonably confident that if you don't
get this job at a reasonably healthy porfit that something
better will come along.
*You plan to use a single production line with no parallel











Hawthorne, CA 902 50
Dear Mr. Raymond,
Reference is made to your REquest for Proposal #29-74. We are
confident that we can meet all terms and conditions of your re-
quest for a total price of $480,800.
As we see the job, there are two components: (1) development
of special tooling and (2) production of the outer cylinder struts.
Based on our past experience, we estimate that the special tool-
ing will cost $191,000. If you would prefer, we will develop
special tooling on a time and materials approach. The hourly
rate, including overhead, G&A and profit will be $32.20 per hour.
We estimate material costs to be $70,000, including a 10% handling
charge
.
The actual machining of the struts should take 100 hours per strut,
Our cost of this portion of the contract is as follows:
100 hours per strut, 100 struts; 10,000 hours
direct labor cost, at $9 per hour $ 90,000
overhead, 150% 135,000




Total cost for struts
Special Tooling
Total
If awarded the contract, we will be able to begin work on the
special tooling immediately and on the production of the outer
cylinder struts in six months.
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